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This report summarizes and describes the main state-driven processes related to the govern-
ance of the coastal fisheries and (marine) aquaculture sectors (i.e. mariculture) in Peru. It was 
produced in the frame of the Peruvian-German Humboldt Tipping project (Social-Ecological 
Tipping Points of the Northern Humboldt Current Upwelling System, Economic Repercussions 
and Governance Strategies) funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search (BMBF). The project aims to assess the risk of decreased marine ecosystem produc-
tivity as a turning point for the ecological, economic and social systems that are interconnected 
under the Humboldt Current Upwelling System (HCUS). Within this framework, the artec Sus-
tainability Research Center of the University of Bremen is responsible for the working package 
which focuses on transdisciplinary science and the analysis of the repercussions of environ-
mental changes for marine governance regimes in Peru (WP 7). 
 The present document originated as part of a larger project deliverable (7.1) summa-
rizing the results of our working package regarding governance analysis and scenario devel-
opment. Here we present the first part (Institutional context and governance of Peruvian fish-
eries and aquaculture) which provides an overview of the different institutions involved in 
coastal-marine governance in Peru and their respective functions. Furthermore, the legal 
framework, input-output controls and surveillance measures, among other details, are de-
scribed for the Peruvian fisheries and aquaculture sectors. For both cases, limitations of gov-
ernance and conflicts in the respective sectors are discussed. 
The original report’s second part (Elaborating socio-economic scenarios - The Humboldt Cur-
rent Upwelling System) was recently published separately and is available as an open access 
publication: 
Garteizgogeascoa M, Kluger LC, Gonzales IE, Damonte G, Flitner M (2020) Contextu-
alizing Scenarios to Explore Social-Ecological Futures: A Three Step Participatory Case Study 
for the Humboldt Current Upwelling System. Frontiers in Marine Science - Marine Conserva-
tion and Sustainability, DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2020.557181. 
                
HUMBOLDT TIPPING is sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research in its 
FONA program.      
 








Marine coastal governance encompasses the formal and informal processes of interaction and 
decision-making of actors involved in any issue of public interest regarding the marine and 
coastal environment. This report focuses primarily on summarizing and describing the main 
state-driven processes related to the governance of the coastal fisheries and (marine) aqua-
culture sectors (i.e. mariculture) in Peru. However, we also explain the predominant tensions 
between resource-based development regulations and key user groups. These tensions in-
clude strategies of contestation and adaptation of users which can involve or relate to informal 
and illegal processes in marine and coastal resource management.  In a short introduction we 
will first provide context to the described processes by framing them with broader debates 
about the ways in which resource-based development is organized in Peru, namely privately 
owned and centralized, and discursively naturalized through narratives that prioritize economic 
growth over sustainability. The following second section provides the broader institutional 
background of fisheries and aquaculture governance by sketching the cornerstones of the Pe-
ruvian legal and political systems. The third section of the report is dedicated to the governance 
of fisheries, especially artisanal and small-scale fisheries, paying special attention to the mech-
anisms of different fishing access regimes. Peruvian artisanal and small-scale fishing is one of 
the most relevant economic activities of the Humboldt Current Upwelling System (HCUS) as it 
provides the majority of fish for domestic human consumption, targeting more than 300 spe-
cies, and employing four times more people than the industrial fisheries. The fourth and last 
section then focuses on the governance of mariculture following the same structure as the 
previous one. In this section, the information presented is being related to the specific case of 
the Peruvian bay scallop [Argopecten purpuratus]. Together with the whiteleg shrimp [Li-
topenaeus vannamei], this species makes up for more than 99 percent of commercial maricul-
ture in Peru over the last decades, and it is of particular importance in the two main research 
areas of our study. The fifth and sixth subsections of the governance of fisheries (i.e. third 
section) and mariculture (i.e. fourth section) describe the limits of current governance and im-
portant lines of conflicts respectively.  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
Please note that some acronyms reflect the Spanish, others the English original name. 
Both translations are provided.  
 
AGRORURAL Rural agricultural productive development program (Span. Programa de 
Desarrollo Productivo Agrario Rural) 
AMYGE Medium and large aquaculture business (Span. Acuicultura de Mediana 
y Gran Empresa) 
AMYPE Micro and small aquaculture business (Span. Acuicultura de Micro y 
Pequeña Empresa) 
ANA  National water authority (Span. Autoridad Nacional del Agua) 
ANP Natural protected áreas (Span. Áreas Naturales Protegidas) 
APN National port authority (Span. Autoridad Portuaria Nacional) 
AREL Limited resources aquaculture (Span. Acuicultura de Recursos Limita-
dos) 
CCRVMA  Convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources 
(Span. Convención para la Conservación de Recursos Marinos Antárti-
cos) 
CENEPRED  National center for disaster risk estimation, prevention and reduction 
(Span. Centro Nacional de Estimación, Prevención y Reducción del 
Riesgo de Desastres) 
CENFOTUR Tourism training center (Span. Centro de Formación en Turismo) 
CEPLAN  National center for strategic planning (Span. Centro Nacional de 
Planeamiento Estratégico) 
CIAT  Inter American tropical tuna commission (Span. Comisión Interameri-
cana del Atún Tropical) 
CITE Productive innovation and technology transfer centers (Span. Centros 
de Innovación Productiva y Transferencia Tecnológica) 
CONCYTEC  National council of science, technology and technological innovation 
(Span. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Tecno-
lógica) 
DHC Direct human consumption (Span. Consumo humano directo) 
DICAPI  General directorate of captaincy and coast guard (Span. Dirección Gen-
eral de Capitanías y Guardacostas) 
DIGESA  General directorate of environmental health (Span. Dirección General 
de Salud Ambiental) 
DIREPRO  Regional directorate of production (Span. Dirección Regional de la 
Producción) 
DL  Legislative decree (Span. Decreto Legislativo) 
DS Supreme decree (Span. Decreto Supremo) 
DVPA  Vice Ministry of fisheries and aquaculture (Span. Despacho Viceministe-
rial de Pesca y Acuicultura) 
EEZ  Exclusive economic zone (Span. Zona económica exclusiva) 
ENSO El Niño Southern oscillation (Span. El Niño Oscilación Sur) 
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EIA Environmental impact assessment (Span. Evaluación de impacto ambi-
ental) 
ENV  Environmental (Span. Medioambiental) 
FAO  Food and agriculture organization of the United Nations (Span. Organi-
zación de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura) 
FIUPAP  Federation of integration and unification of artisanal fishers of Peru 
(Span. Federación de Integración y Unificación de los Pescadores Ar-
tesanales del Perú)  
FOB  Free-on-board value (Span. Libre a bordo, Puerto de carga convenido) 
FONDEPA  Artisanal fisheries development fund (Span. Fondo de Desarrollo Pes-
quero Artesanal) 
FOFIP  Fisheries infrastructure financing fund (Span. Fondo de Financiamiento 
de Infraestructura Pesquera) 
FONRESPE  Fishing sector reactivation fund (Span. Fondo de Reactivación del Sec-
tor Pesquero) 
FONDEPES  National fund for fisheries development (Span. Fondo Nacional de De-
sarrollo Pesquero) 
GFL   General fishing law (Span. Ley general de pesca) 
HCUS  Humboldt current upwelling system (Span. Sistema de la corriente de 
Humboldt) 
HIDRONAV  Hydrography and navigation department (Span. Dirección de Hidro-
grafía y Navegación) 
IHC  Indirect human consumption (Span. Consumo humano indirecto) 
IIAP Research institute of the Peruvian Amazon (Span. Instituto de Investi-
gaciones de la Amazonía Peruana) 
IGP  Geophysical institute of Peru (Span. Instituto Geofísico del Perú) 
IMARPE  Institute of the sea of Peru (Span. Instituto del Mar del Perú) 
INEI  National institute of statistics and informatics (Span. Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística e Informática) 
INGEMMET  Geological, mining and metallurgical institute (Span. Instituto Geológico, 
Minero y Metalúrgico) 
INS  National institute of health (Span. Instituto Nacional de Salud) 
ITP  Fishing technological institute (Span. Instituto Tecnológico Pesquero) 
ITQ  Individual Transferable Quotas (Span. Cuotas individuales transferibles) 
IUU   Illegal, unreported and unregulated (Span. Pesca ilegal, no declarada y 
no reglamentada) 
IVQ   Individual vessel quota (Span. Límite máximo de captura por embar-
cación) 
LMCE  Individual vessel quota (Span. Límite Máximo de Captura por Embar-
cación) 
LMCTP  Total allowable catch (Span. Límite Máximo de Captura Total Permisi-
ble) 
MEF  Ministry of economy and finance (Span. Ministerio de Economía y Fi-
nanzas) 
MEIA  Modification of environmental impact assessment (Span. Modificatoria 
de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) 
MINEM  Ministry of energy and mines (Span. Ministerio de Energía y Minas) 
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MIDIS   Ministry of development and social inclusion (Span. Ministerio de Desar-
rollo e Inclusión Social) 
MIMP  Ministry of women and vulnerable populations (Span. Ministerio de la 
Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables) 
MINAGRI  Ministry of agriculture and irrigation (Span. Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Riego) 
MINAM  Ministry of environment (Span. Ministerio del Ambiente) 
MINCETUR  Ministry of foreign trade and tourism (Span. Ministerio de Comercio Ex-
terior y Turismo) 
MINSA  Ministry of health (Span. Ministerio de Salud) 
MSES   Marine social-ecological system (Span. Sistema socio-ecológico ma-
rino) 
MTC   Ministry of transport and communications (Span. Ministerio de Trans-
porte y Comunicaciones) 
NGO   Non-governmental organization (Span. Organización no-gubernamen-
tal) 
OEFA  Environmental assessment and inspection agency (Span. Organismo 
de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental) 
OSPA  Artisanal fishers’ social organization (Span. Organización Social de 
Pescadores Artesanales) 
PCMB Bivalve mollusc control program (Span. Programa de Control de Molus-
cos Bivalvos) 
PDIPA:  Artisanal fishing infrastructure plan (Span. Plan de Infraestructura Pes-
quera Artesanal) 
PDRC  Concerted regional development plans (Span. Planes de Desarrollo Re-
gional Concertado) 
PCM  Presidency of the council of ministers (Span. Presidencia del Consejo 
de Ministros) 
PMP   Fishing management plans (Span. Planes de Manejo Pesquero) 
PRODUCE  Ministry of production (Span. Ministerio de la Producción) 
PROINVERSION Private investment promotion agency (Span. Agencia de Promoción de 
la Inversión Privada) 
PROMPERU  Peruvian promotion commission for export and tourism (Span. Comisión 
de Promoción del Perú para la Exportación y el Turismo) 
RE   Executive resolution (Span. Resolución Ejecutiva) 
RD   Directorate resolution (Span. Resolución Directoral) 
RISPAC Regulation of fiscalization and sanction of fishing and aquaculture activi-
ties (Span. Reglamento de Fiscalización y Sanción de las Actividades 
Pesqueras y Acuícolas)  
RISSPA  Regulation of infractions and sanitary sanctions for fisheries and aqua-
culture (Span. Reglamento de Infracciones y Sanciones Sanitarias Pes-
queras y Acuícolas) 
RM   Ministerial resolution (Span. Resolución Ministerial) 
ROP Fishing regulation schemes (Span. Reglamento de Ordenamiento Pes-
quero) 
RS  Supreme resolution (Span. Resolución Suprema) 
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SANIPES National agency for fisheries health (Span. Organismo Nacional de San-
idad Pesquero) 
SEIA  National system of environmental impact assessment (Span. Sistema 
Nacional de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) 
SENACE  National service of environmental certification for sustainable invest-
ments (Span. Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las In-
versiones Sostenibles) 
SENAMHI  National service of meteorology and hydrology of Peru (Span. Servicio 
Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología del Perú)  
SERNANP  National servive of natural protected areas by the state (Span. Servicio 
Nacional de áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado) 
SES Social-Ecological System (Span: Sistema socio-ecológico) 
SINACUI  National aquaculture system of Peru (Span. Sistema Nacional de Acui-
cultura de Perú) 
SINAGERD  National system of disaster risk management (Span. Sistema Nacional 
de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres)  
SINANPE  National system of natural protected areas by the state (Span. Sistema 
Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado) 
SINEFA  National system of environmental assessment and inspection (Span. 
Sistema Nacional de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental) 
SINIA  National system of environmental information (Span. Sistema Nacional 
del Información Ambiental) 
SISESAT  Vessel satellite tracking system (Span. Sistema de Seguimiento Sateli-
tal de Embarcaciones) 
SNGRH  National system of water resources management (Span. Sistema Naci-
onal de Gestión de Recursos Hídricos) 
SNP   National fisheries society (Span. Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería) 
SOC   Socio-economic (Span. Socio-económico) 
SPRFMO  South Pacific regional fisheries management organisation (Span. Or-
ganización regional de gestión pesquera del Pacífico Sur) 
SUNAT  National superintendency of customs and tax administration (Span. Su-
perintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria) 
TAC   Total allowable catch (Span. Límite máximo de captura total permisible) 
TGPSM  San Martín terminal port (Span. Terminal Portuario General San Martín) 
TPP  Paracas terminal port (Span. Terminal Portuario Paracas) 
VUA  Unique window for aquaculture (Span. Ventanilla Única de Acuicultura) 
WP  Working package (Span. Grupo de trabajo) 












With an average annual capture production of 6,4x106 tons (for the period 2005-2014), Peru 
ranks as the second most important fisheries producer worldwide (after China), mainly due to 
the landings of the Peruvian anchoveta [Engraulis ringens] (anchoveta hereinafter), which rep-
resents 85% of annual catches (FAO, 2018). The fisheries sector represents, after mining, 
Peru’s most important production sector, contributing between 0.7 and 1.5% to the country’s 
GDP (for the period 2008-2017; PRODUCE, 2018). To a lesser extent but also relevant, the 
aquaculture sector has also experienced economic growth since its emergence in 1970s, and, 
as with fisheries, this growth has been sustained by the exploitation of only few species: trout 
[Oncorchynchus mykiss] and tilapia [Oreochromis aureus] for continental aquaculture, and Pe-
ruvian bay scallop [Argopecten purpuratus] and whiteleg shrimp [Litopenaeus vannamei] for 
mariculture. The export of these primary commodities (together with hydrocarbon) has allowed 
Peru to undergo a sustained GDP growth since the beginning of the 21st century, positioning 
itself as a key Latin American extractivist nation. 
Peru´s extractivist political economic strategy has been facilitated by a series of liber-
alization and privatization policies that started in the 1990s and are enshrined in the constitu-
tion of 1993. This way, Peru follows a development model where privately owned large-scale 
extractive companies/corporations lead production (Andreucci and Kallis, 2017; Bebbington 
and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011; Ibarra et al., 2000a, b) while the state has a subsidiary role 
in it (it has to foster and regulate private productive forces but cannot compete with/take over 
or complement them). In the case of marine living resource extraction, this means that the 
state fosters the development of industrial fishing/mariculture enterprises over small or mid-
sized activities. As we will show in this report, some actions towards this mandate include 
regulations to promote industrial fishing while regulating small-scale fisher activities to assure 
that these do not compete with industrial fishing. A further example is the granting of private 
rights to Peruvian bay scallop producers to facilitate capital concentration in this subsector, 
even at the cost of privatizing marine space.  
Many of the extractive regulatory processes are controlled and determined by the cen-
tral government in Lima despite the process of decentralization that officially started in July 
2002 (Law N° 27783 [2002]). This process was planned to be carried gradually by stages 
(art.83.); being in its third stage (started in 2004) when the transfer of functions to the regional 
governments in the productive sectors (in this case fisheries and mariculture) would take place. 
However, for many regions, by December of 2018 (RM N° 577-2018-PRODUCE) the Ministry 
of Production (PRODUCE) was still transferring functions in fisheries matters from the compe-
tence of regional governments as stated in their organic laws. Moreover, technical and financial 
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resources have not been transferred sufficiently to accomplish the according tasks (Contraloría 
General de la República, 2014).  Generally, industrial fishing falls under the responsibility of 
PRODUCE while artisanal and small-scale fisheries are supervised by regional governments 
(DIREPRO). However, the decentralization has been partly reversed in recent years with 
PRODUCE taking over some regulatory functions as in the case of the large-scale aquaculture 
production (> 150 gross tons/year).  
It is also important to mention that the Peruvian resource-based development strategy 
has been discursively naturalized through narratives of sustainability. In 2007 the World Bank 
published a report in which extractivism and sustainability in Peru were pictured as compatible 
and mutually reinforcing as the fiscal revenues of extractive industries could constitute a major 
source of benefits for the promotion of sustainability. Moreover, Takahasi and Meisner (2012) 
which studied the competing discourses in the debate about the creation of the Ministry of 
Environment (MINAM) found that it was dominated by neoliberal discourses. However, in prac-
tice the sustainability of the marine-coastal social ecological systems of Peru is at risk. While 
the extractive industries are major potential sources of pollution, the Peruvian environmental 
regulations are weak and the role of the MINAM minor. Moreover, the concentration of the 
fisheries sector on a single species is a factor that has – more than once – been criticized in 
the context of sustainability practices (Mailuf et al., 2016). Specifically, in Peru conflicts be-
tween the artisanal/small-scale and industrial fishing sectors typically concern the perceived 
(and actual) exclusion of the former to formally take part in high profit economic activities (such 
as the production of fishmeal/ fish oil economic) which pushes fisheries towards different types 
of overfishing.  
With ever increasing complexity of human activities in the marine-coastal space, it is – 
as a first step – important to understand the legislative framework that aims at regulating these 
activities. We use the Peruvian study setting for a discussion of the broader legal framework 
and different institutions involved in the fisheries sector (section A), to then present regulatory 
tools for the management of the fisheries (section B) and mariculture sector (section C). In 
addition, sections B and C close with a final part in which we present the main informal and 
illegal processes and practices as well as conflicts surrounding marine fisheries and aquacul-
ture in Peru. This will serve as an important baseline for future scientific studies on marine and 
coastal governance in the scope of the Humboldt Tipping Project as understanding the ten-
sions between state interventions and the “self-governance” efforts of coastal communities can 
be critical to establish and effective framework for marine and coastal resources use 
(Snelgrove et al., 2009; Nakandakari et al., 2017; Jiménez and Saavedra-Díaz, 2018).  
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A - LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF FISHERIES AND 
AQUACULTURE IN PERU 
 
A.1. The State  
The current Peruvian constitution was enacted in 1993. Regarding the marine and costal en-
vironments, it is important to highlight that the document points in its art.66. (cap. II. Del ambi-
ente y los recursos naturales) that the state controls the renewable and non-renewable re-
sources and is the one that grants permits for their use to others. 
Los recursos naturales, renovables y no renovables, son patrimonio de la Nación. El 
Estado es soberano en su aprovechamiento y de su otorgamiento a particulares. 
Por ley orgánica se fijan las condiciones de su utilización y de su otorgamiento a par-
ticulares. La concesión otorga a su titular un derecho real, sujeto a dicha norma legal. 
In line with this approach, the General Fishing Law (GFL hereinafter) (DL N° 25977 [1992]), 
which is the overarching regulatory framework for fisheries, declares that the “hydro-biological 
resources contained in the jurisdictional waters of Peru are the patrimony of the nation” and 
that is the responsibility of the state to “regulate the integrated management and rational ex-
ploitation of these resources” (art.2.). However, some authors have pointed to the problematic 
rhetorical separation of the ‘nation’ from the ‘state’ employed in the law; this way the national 
could stand in for the interests of private businesses when opposed to state control as we have 
previously mentioned (Viatori and Medina, 2019). 
As laid down in the constitution, the Peruvian state has three independent powers: 
legislative, executive and judicial power.  
 
A.1.1. Legislative Power 
This power resides in the Congress of the Republic which is formed by 130 delegates that are 
elected every five years through electoral processes. The congress’ main function is to issue 
laws and legislative resolutions as well as to interpret, modify or repeal existing ones; also, 
through organic laws regulates the structure and functioning of the state. Figure 1. shows the 
hierarchical legal system of Peru. 
 
A.1.2. Executive Power 
The executive power is in charge of enforcing the laws and promoting state policies. It is com-
posed of the presidency of the Republic, the council of ministers and the public entities of the 
executive power.  
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The president of the Republic is the head of the state for five years and among other 
things must comply and enforce the constitution, treaties, laws and other legal provisions; di-
rect the general policy of the government; and exercise the power to regulate laws, issue de-
creed and resolutions.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical scheme of the Peruvian legal system. The approving authority for the organic laws and 
ordinary laws is the Congress of the Republic. The approving authority for the legislative decrees, the emergency, 
the supreme decrees and the supreme resolutions is the parliament of the Republic; the last two together with the 
minister council. The minister council is also the approving authority for the ministerial resolutions. And the parlia-
ment is also the approving authority of the law decrees. The directorial resolutions are approved by the administra-
tive directors and the executive resolutions by the administrative heads. The regional and municipal ordinances and 
decrees are approved by the regional governments or the major.  
Source: adapted from https://www.mardelperu.pe/pesca/3/reglas-de-juego-en-el-sector-pesca. 
Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
The council of minister is responsible for the direction and management of public ser-
vices. The council of minister also has a president. The president (i.e. president of the council 
of ministers) and the ministers are appointed and removed by the president of the Republic. 
The president of the council of ministers can or cannot be a minister. The council of ministers 
mainly approves bills that the president of the Republic submits to the congress and approves 
legislative decrees and emergency decrees issued by the president of the Republic.  In Table 
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Table 1. Summary of the main institutions of the executive power that are related to the management of the ma-
rine-coastal environments. 
Sector Institution Role in the HCUS 
Agrarian MINAGRI Governing body in charge of formulating and supervising the na-
tional agrarian policy. Given that coastal agriculture has grown 
this institution is important to for the Humboldt coastal-marine 
SES.  
AGRORURAL Extract and commercialize guano from the islands. 
ANA Its mission is to administer and supervise the use of water re-
sources ensuring their quality, quantity and good ecological sta-
tus. It is important for several reasons: it collaborates with 
IMARPE on the monitoring of the river mouths and the fact that 
freshwater water availability is a main issue in coastal communi-
ties such as those of the regions of Ica and Piura where water is 
scarce or there is a lack of water sanitation systems.  
Environment 
 
MINAM Created in 2008 (DL N° 1013 [2008]) 
The aim is the conservation of the environment ensuring the sus-
tainable, responsible, rational and ethical use of natural re-
sources and the environments that supports them. 
Since 2015 (RM N° 1899 – 2015-MINAM) they have been en-
gaged in promoting the intersectoral work between institutions to 
develop an integral management of the marine-coastal environ-
ments. 
They actively participate with local communities. 
It is formed by the SEIA (Sistema nacional de evaluación de im-
pacto ambiental), SNGRH (Sistema nacional de gestión de recur-
sos hídricos), SINIA (Sistema nacional de información ambien-
tal), SINEFA (Sistema nacional de evaluación y fiscalización am-
biental), and the SINANPE (Sistema nacional de áreas natural 
protegidas del estado). 
SERNANP Attached to the MINAM, is in charge of directing and establishing 
the technical and administrative criteria for the conservation of 
the natural protected areas (ANP; which can be the following 
types: with permanente status - reserva nacional, coto de caza, 
santuario histórico, parque nacional, reserva comunal, santuario 
nacional, bosque de protección, reserva paisajística, refugio de 
vida silvestre; and with transitory status- zonas reservadas (e.g. 
Illescas in the northern coast)). 
Carries out the work in coordination with regional, local govern-
ments and owners of properties recognized as private conserva-
tion areas. And promotes citizen participation in the management 
of the ANP. 
Establishes the inspection and control mechanism, as well as the 
corresponding administrative infractions and sanctions. Apply the 
sanctions of: reprimand, fine, confiscation, immobilization, closure 
or suspension. 
Is the governing body of the SINANPE which aims to contribute 
to the sustainable development of Peru through biodiversity con-
servation.  
OEFA Specialized technical body attached to MINAM and in charge of 
environmental inspection, supervision, control and sanction. 
SENAMHI Plan, organize, coordinate, regulate, direct and supervise meteor-
ological, hydrological and related activities, through scientific re-
search, studies and projects, and the provision of services in mat-
ters within its competence. 
SENACE Review and approve the EIA that comprise public, private or 
mixed capital investment projects, of national and multi-regional 
scope that involve activities that may cause a significant environ-
mental impact. *Except for the EIA that are excluded by DS with 
the vote from the council of ministers 








MINCETUR Important as it is related to activities that directly and indirectly af-
fect the HCUS such as the promotion of exports and tourism. 
Taken into consideration that coastal-marine national and interna-
tional tourism has expanded and fisheries and agrarian exports 
are still rising, the mission of the MINCETUR to promote the sus-
tainable development of the foreign trade, tourism and crafts is of 
critical importance for the HCUS. 
PROMPERU For the fishing sector, PROMPERU compiles and publishes an-
nual export statistics; it analyzes the development of new prod-
ucts and target markets. For the tourism sector, it proposes poli-
cies for the diffusion of the image of Peru in order to attract tour-
ists and international investments. 
CENFOTUR Train people needed in all areas for the country´s tourism devel-
opment. 
Defense DICAPI Responsible for regulating and ensuring the safety of human life, 
the protection of the environment and its natural resources as 
well as for repressing all illegal acts – exercising control and sur-
veillance of all activities carried out in the aquatic environment. 
It dictates regulations for compliance with international laws and 
conventions; controls and registers the afloat material dedicated 
to maritime, river and lake activities; it also regulates the activities 
carried out by natural and legal persons in the aquatic environ-
ment. 
In relation to pollution, it works to control and surveil (ships, 
aquatic facilities, etc.) to prevent and combat the effects of pollu-
tion. It aims to detect unauthorized discharges and in oil spills 
scenarios is in charge to execute the national contingency plan. 
Also responsible for the administration of the international agree-
ment or prevent pollution by ships and the international maritime 
code for dangerous goods. 
In charge of the (pre) registration of vessels and monitoring (post-
registration) the vessels. 
In charge of the training of: artisanal and industrial fishers, mer-
chant seafarers, divers, companies engage in rescue activities, 
etc., in coordination with the maritime training centers 
HIDRONAV Administer, operate and investigate activities related to environ-
mental science in the aquatic environment, in order to contribute 
to the national development and provide support and safety in 
navigation.  
Economy MEF It guides the development of economic activities such as fishing, 
aquaculture, tourism, hydrocarbon extraction, mining, etc., and 
grants research budgets to IMARPE, ITP, IGP, INGEMMET or 
control and surveillance budgets to OEFA and PRODUCE. 
SUNAT Besides the functions of administration, collection and inspection 
of the taxes, SUNAT plays and important role in the systematiza-
tion of the legislation and statistical information on foreign trade, 
as well as that related to internal and customs taxes. This is es-
sential, for example, to validate the production of national fish-
meal and verify, by means of a mass balance, the true magnitude 
of anchoveta landings. 
SUNAT controls merchandise traffic. Which is particularly im-
portant for the development of traceability fisheries and aquacul-
ture systems.  
PROINVERSION Is in charge of promoting investment none dependent on the Pe-
ruvian state by agents under the private regime with the aim of 





are important for the 
HCUS for the in-
creasing marine-
MINEM Its purpose is to promote private investment in mining-energy ac-
tivities within a competitive legal framework, within a sustainable 
development approach and encouraging research and training; 
also contributing to the preservation of the environment, to 
achieving a safe industry, to harmonious relations between the 
actors and to energy development with a criterion of subsidiarity. 
At the functional level, MINEM (i) formulates and executes the 
policies for the promotion and technification of electricity, hydro-
carbons and mining, (ii) evaluates and updates the inventory of 









from mining and oil 
activities (see sub-
section B.6.4 & 
C.6.2) 
the country's mining and energy resources, (iii) guides and en-
courages research scientific and technological within the scope of 
its competence, (iv) grants concessions and concludes contracts 
for the development of mining-energy activities, (v) promotes the 
strengthening of the relations of companies in the Energy and 
Mining Sector with the civil society or population involved in the 
development of their activities, (vi) fosters the efficient use of en-
ergy and the use and development of renewable energy re-
sources, and (vii) maintains coordination relationships on the 
management of sustainable sector development with the regional 
governments and local governments: 
Aims are mainly carried out through the Geological Mining and 
Metallurgical Institute (INGEMMET). 
PeruPetro S. A State company of private law that seeks to promote investment 
and supervise hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities 
in the country, harmonizing the interests of the state, communi-
ties and investors.  
It also proposes to the MINEM policy options related to the use of 
hydrocarbons and participated in the preparation of sectoral 
plans. 
Social MIDIS Important role because many of the users of the HCUS live in 
poverty. 
MIMP In charge of policies related to gender equality, the protection and 
development of vulnerable sector of the population and minori-




Health MINSA  
DIGESA Part of the Ministry of Health (MINSA). In charge of proposing 
and enforcing the national environmental health policy in order to 
control polluting agents and improve environmental conditions for 
the protection of the heath of the population. 
INS In charge of promoting food security for vulnerable population.  
PCM CEPLAN Seeks to exercise the effective stewardship of the National Stra-
tegic Planning System, conducting it in a participatory, transpar-
ent and concerted manner, thus contributing to the improvement 
of the quality of life of the population and the sustainable develop-
ment of the country. 
CONCYTEC Responsible for directing, promoting, coordinating, supervising 
and evaluating the state action in the fields of science, technology 
and technological innovation; and guide the actions of the private 
sector in these realms. 
CENEPRED Its mission is to coordinate, facilitate and supervise the formula-
tion and implementation of the National Policy and the National 
Plan for the Management of Disaster Risk, in what corresponds 
to the processes of Estimation, Prevention and Reduction of dis-
aster risk and Reconstruction; as well as developing guidelines 
and providing technical assistance to the Governing Body and the 
entities that make up SINAGERD (Sistema nacional de gestión 
del riesgo de desastres), on the policy, mechanisms and tech-
nical instruments necessary for planning and organization. 
 INEI responsible for producing and disseminating the official statistical 
information that the country needs, with the quality, opportunity 
and coverage required, with the purpose of contributing to the de-
sign, monitoring and evaluation of public policies and to the deci-
sion-making process of socioeconomic agents, the public sector, 
and the community in general. 
Production PRODUCE In charge of leading the national policy of fishing and aquaculture 
at a national level in both marine and continental waters. It formu-
lates, approves and supervises the fisheries management and 
promotes the scientific and technological research of the sector. 
Its scope extends over the ecological conditions of the species´ 
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habitat, the shape, quality and health of the exploitation, pro-
cessing and marketing means and the species themselves. Re-
garding aquaculture it is the maximum authority and is responsi-
ble for directing the SINACUI 
FONDEPES Aims to promote, through technical and financial support, the de-
velopment of artisanal fishing and aquaculture activities in marine 
and continental areas. In particular, it is dedicated to the provision 
of basic infrastructure such as artisanal fishing docks as well as 
aquaculture hatcheries.  
 
ITP In charge of the development, innovation, adaptation and techno-
logical transfer in order to develop better quality products and 
new aquaculture technologies. 
IMARPE Institution in charge of providing the scientific information in which 
the regulatory frameworks will be based.  
SANIPES Responsible for regulating, supervising, sanctioning and anything 
related to health throughout the production chain of the fishery 







MTC Through the general directorate of aquatic transport is in charge 
of promoting, regulating and managing the development of water 
transport activities as well as waterways. 
Important also due to its functions related to the authorization and 
inspection of tourist water transport services. 
Together with DICAPI ensures the compliance with international 
agreements 
ENAPU S.A. Institution in charge of managing and maintaining the ports of the 
Peruvian state 







and sanitation  
Designs, regulates, executes, supervises and evaluated the poli-
cies and actions regarding housing, urban planning, construction 
and sanitation. Therefore, it is important, as more than 50% of 
Peruvian population is settle in coastal areas. 
It has to coordinate with ANA and MINAM water management is-
sues.  
Source: adaptated from De la Puente and Sueiro, 2013; Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
Other institutions that played a role in the marine-coastal environment and that for example 
have been part of the working group to develop the national marine policy are: the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture.  
 
A.1.3. Judicial Power 
The judicial power emanates from the people and is exercised through the hierarchical struc-
ture of judicature, in accordance with the constitution and the laws. It is made up of jurisdic-
tional bodies that administer justice on behalf of the nation. The jurisdiction bodies are: the 
supreme court of justice, the superior courts of justice, the specialized and mixed courts, the 
legal courts of justice and the justice of peace. The president of the supreme court is also the 
president of the judicial power. According to the constitution, the jurisdictional function is in-
compatible with any other public or private activity with the exception of university teaching. 
Regarding the scope of the marine-coastal environment is relevant in the sense that is the 
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contentious administrative action that allows to challenge the administrative resolutions of the 
executive. 
 
A.2. Regional Governments 
At the end of 2002 the current regional governments were created through the Law N° 27867 
[2002]. It is important to note that, at first, the proposal of decentralization/regionalization im-
plied that the regions were going to be constituted by several of the departments in which Peru 
is divided; however, at the end this did not occur. Instead, regional governments created gen-
erally coincided with the departmental limits. Therefore, the departments refer to the geograph-
ical delimitation of a jurisdiction and the regions to the political-administrative matters. There 
are some exceptions to this rule, for instance the Provincia Constitucional del Callao, inside 
the Lima department, has its own regional government. So, since 2003 there are 24 depart-
ments and 2 provinces with special regimes (Provincia Constitucional del Callao and Provincia 
de Lima). From the 24 departments 10 are coastal (from south to north: Tacna, Moquegua, 
Arequipa, Ica, Lima, Áncash, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Piura and Tumbes).  
 The regional governments must formulate and approve the concerted regional devel-
opment plans (PDRC) with the municipalities and the civil society. Regarding the PDRC and 
the fisheries activity, the NGO Oceana conducted an analysis in 2018 (Pajuelo and Sueiro, 
2018) and concluded that many coastal regions describe the fisheries activities only briefly and 
in a very simplistic way; that these descriptions are usually centered on infrastructure issues 
(e.g. landing sites) despite the fact that PRODUCE (i.e. national level) is responsible for this. 
Specific aims or strategic actions for the fisheries sector are (almost) non-existent in many of 
them (such as the PDRC 2010-2021 of Ica or PDRC 2016-2021 of Piura) (Pajuelo and Sueiro, 
2018). This is surprising as Ica and Piura are departments where artisanal fishing and aqua-
culture are key livelihoods activities (PRODUCE, 2018). Regarding aquaculture activities at a 
regional scale, the national aquaculture plan (approved through DS N° 001-2010-PRODUCE) 
includes promoting regional aquaculture plans, however not all departments have it.  
The aquaculture competences are shared between the national government (through 
PRODUCE) and the regional and local governments (through DIREPRO); the latter are in 
charge of the limited resource aquaculture (AREL) and micro and small business aquaculture 
(AMYPE), while PRODUCE is in charge of medium and large company aquaculture (AMYGE) 
(see section C). Same occurs for the fisheries competences, the Law N°27867 [2002] (art.52.) 
established that the functions related to the artisanal fishing were transferred from PRODUCE 
to its corresponding DIREPRO (except the artisanal fisheries in Lima Metropolitana). There-
fore, PRODUCE has exclusive competences for the fisheries and aquaculture management at 
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national level, the large-scale fishing and fishing in national protected areas. Figure 2 summa-
rizes the regional competence related to artisanal fisheries. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Summary of the main regional competences to the artisanal fisheries. 
Source: Pajuelo and Sueiro, 2018; Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
Various cases, and especially in fisheries management matters, have been docu-
mented in which national norms and objectives are in conflict with regional ordinances (De la 
Puente et al., 2011). Also, in reality many of the competences have not been transferred or 
cannot be exercised meaningfully; for example, regarding the first point of Figure 2, none of 
the regional governments has an exclusive regional plan related to artisanal fisheries (there is 
no national plan for artisanal fisheries as there is for aquaculture). In this regard, in 2019 the 
national marine policy was approved (DS N°012-2019-DE) as a first attempt to develop a com-
mon plan to avoid the fragmentation of aims and actions; however, is not particularly focusing 
on artisanal fisheries. During a fieldwork phase in November and December of 2019, several 
Formulate, approve, execute, evaluate, direct, control and manage the plans and policies on 
fisheries and aquaculture production in the region.
Manage, supervise and inspect the management of fishing activities and services under its 
jurisdiction.
Develop surveillance and control actions to guarantee the sustainable use of resources under its 
jurisdiction
Promote the provision of private financial resources to companies and organizations in the region; 
with a special emphasis on small and medium size and export oriented ones.
Develop and implement systems of information and make them available to the population
Promote, control and manage the use of the infrastructure services for the landing and processing 
of fish (with the exception of the control and surveillance of the health standards).
Verify the compliance and correct application of the legal devices of control and inspection of 
chemical inputs for fishing and aquaculture puposes. Dictate the corrective measures and saction.
Promote the research and information about the techonological services for the preservation and 
protection of the environment.
Ensure and demand the adequate compliance with the technical standards in fisheries. Dictate the 
corrective measures and saction.
Monitor the strict compliance with the current regulation on artisanal fishing and its exclusivity 
within the five nautical miles. Dictate the corrective measures and saction.
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fishers from the region of Ica expressed their will to develop an artisanal fisheries regional 
plan. Also, regarding the last point of Figure 2, the regional governments do not have marine 
jurisdiction. 
More generally, the decentralization process was not accompanied by an adequate 
budget transfer. Between 2005 and 2018, the budget allocated to fishing has been on average 
0,25 % of the total regional budget. This includes expenses in: administration (20-45% of the 
quarter percent), fisheries (10-30%) and aquaculture (35-55%) (Pajuelo and Sueiro, 2018).  
 
 
A.3. State Fisheries and Aquaculture Institutions 
Several institutions are involved in the Peruvian fisheries and aquaculture legislation and reg-
ulation (Figure 3, following page).  
 
A.3.1. Ministerio de la Producción - PRODUCE 
The Ministry of Production through its Vice Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture1 (DVPA) is 
in charge of leading the national policy of fishing and aquaculture at a national level in both 
marine and continental waters. It formulates, approves and supervises the fisheries manage-
ment and promotes the scientific and technological research of the sector. Its scope extends 
over the ecological conditions of the species´ habitat, the shape, quality and health of the ex-
ploitation, processing and marketing means and the species themselves. 
Regarding aquaculture it is the highest authority and responsible for directing the na-
tional aquaculture system (SINACUI) (see subsection A.3.8.) to ensure compliance with 
SINACUI´s objectives (art.4. - DS N° 003-2016-PRODUCE) which are the following: 
1. Coordinate the application of the national aquaculture policy at the national level.  
2. Promote a) the development of sustainable aquaculture, through research, technolog-
ical development and innovation, b) the diversification of aquaculture activities, c) the 
administrative simplification, and d) the application of good practices, recognizing the 
environmental, cultural, economic and social value of aquaculture activities.  
3. Promote the continuous improvement and integration of the administrative procedures 
and instruments and aquaculture management.  
4. Promote and coordinate actions that contribute to the prevention and resilience of the 
aquaculture subsector against climate change and other external factors.  
5. Promote the generation of spaces for coordination with the public and private organi-
zations linked to the aquaculture activity.  
                                                          
1 Previously Ministry of Fisheries. 
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6. Promote food security through aquaculture in less developed socio-economic areas. 
 
PRODUCE, together with the regional governments is in charge of the supervision and control 
of the aquaculture authorizations and concessions, in order to achieve the sustainable devel-
















Figure 3. Governmental institutions regulating Peruvian fishing and scope of operation. 
Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales  
 
A.3.2. Instituto del Mar Peruano - IMARPE 
IMARPE is a dependent entity of PRODUCE that aims to carry out scientific research in order 
to promote the rational and sustainable use of hydrobiological resources. It is the institution in 
charge of providing the information in which the regulatory frameworks will be based. For in-
stance, it is the one that provides the technical opinion for the establishment of quotas, for the 
opening and closing of fishing seasons and for the establishment of catch minimum sizes. Its 
research programs are also directed towards the development of a sustainable national aqua-
culture both marine and continental (i.e. in inland waters); it can also bring support to the pri-
vate sector in the execution of research projects and experimental pilot studies of new culti-
vated species. In this regard, IMARPE implements scientific, technological and innovation re-
search programs, as well as experimental pilot cultures in the aquaculture centers of the pro-
duction sector in order to move on the productive escalation of species of high commercial 
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priorities stated in the national program of science, technological development and innovation 
of aquaculture from PRODUCE. 
 
A.3.3. Centros de Innovación Productiva y Transferencia Tecnológica - CITEs 
These centers form part of the Technological Institute of Production (ITP), which is a depend 
entity of PRODUCE that is in charge of the development, innovation, adaptation and techno-
logical transfer in order to develop better quality products and new aquaculture technologies. 
The CITEs are classified by production chain. The CITE involved in fisheries is the CITE Pes-
quero Acuícola, and there are currently two CITEs dedicated to marine-fishing resources: CITE 
Callao and CITE Piura. CITEs are conceived as points of confluence between the state, the 
academy and the private sector, to the extent that it promotes research for innovation and 
improvement of products in favor of improving their competitiveness and a better use of the 
market opportunities by the national companies. They also provide capacity development for 
fishers’ trough the promotion of courses.  
 
A.3.4. Organismo Nacional de Sanidad Pesquera - SANIPES 
Technical entity attached to PRODUCE, funded in 2014, that is responsible for regulating2, 
supervising and sanctioning3 anything related to health throughout the production chain of the 
fishery and aquaculture resources, from their extraction to the final consumption. It evaluates 
and grants sanitary habilitations to vessels, landing sites, harvest areas, transporting vehicles 
and processing plants. Likewise, it is in charge of sanctioning non-compliance with health 
codes as appropriate. In addition, they issue sanitary registries and official sanitary certificates 
for the commercialization of hydrobiological products inside and outside the country.  
 
A.3.5. Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Pesquero - FONDEPES 
The National Fund for Fisheries Development is the result of the merger of the funds for: 1) 
the fisheries infrastructure financing (FOFIP), 2) the fishing sector reactivation (FONRESPE), 
3) the artisanal fisheries development (FONDEPA), and 4) the artisanal fishing infrastructure 
program (PDIPA). It aims to promote, through technical and financial support, the development 
of artisanal fishing and aquaculture activities in marine and continental areas. In particular, it 
is dedicated to the provision of basic infrastructure such as artisanal fishing docks as well as 
aquaculture hatcheries.  
                                                          
2 During the fieldwork phase of November-December 2019 it was mentioned that SANIPES wanted to update the 
regulative scheme by the end of the year because the one available was from 2001. However, it is still not available 
(20th May 2020). 
3 The Reglamento de Infracciones y Sanciones Sanitarias Pesqueras Acuícolas (RISSPA) has not yet been ap-
proved.  
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A.3.6. Dirección Regional de la Producción - DIREPRO 
DIREPRO is the representation of PRODUCE in the regional governments. Since the decen-
tralization process, the regional governments, had to assumed the leading role of the artisanal 
fisheries and aquaculture policy in the region (always in line with the national policy). They 
have power over the administration, supervision and control of artisanal fishing activity in the 
region, as well as control of the landing infrastructure and fisheries processing. They ensure 
compliance with regulations on the extraction of hydrobiological resources in the area of 5 
miles. Regarding aquaculture, they are in charge of the environmental supervision and control 
of aquaculture activities regarding micro and small companies (< 150 gross tons/year). 
 
A.3.7. Dirección General de Capitanías y Guardacostas - DICAPI 
DICAPI is the authority in the maritime, fluvial and lake areas responsible for monitoring and 
sanctioning acts against the safety of people, the environment and the sustainability of hydro-
biological resources. Port captain officers are responsible for registering vessel departures, 
monitoring the status of the crew and vessels, conducting surveillance operations at sea and 
penalize acts such as the fishing with illegal gear or the extraction of forbidden species. 
 
A.3.8. Sistema Nacional de Acuicultura - SINACUI 
The SINACUI aims to 1) guide, integrate, coordinate, execute, supervise, evaluate and guar-
antee the application and compliance of the public policies, plans, programs and actions ori-
ented to promote the growth and development of the aquaculture at a national level; and to 2) 
promote aquaculture practices that contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of the 
environment where it is developed, in accordance with the regulatory framework in force. For 
this an intersectoral participation (within state institutions and between state institutions and 
users) is required.  
The following institutions make up the SINACUI: PRODUCE, MINAM, DICAPI, 
SERNANP, OEFA (in charge of the environmental supervision and control of the aquaculture 
activities regarding medium and large company aquaculture activities), ANA (in charge of the 
supervision and control of the spills of the primary processing), PROMPERU, ITP, research 
institute of the Peruvian Amazon (IIAP), SANIPES, FONDEPES, DIREPRO and all the other 
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A.4. Private and Civil Society Institutions in Fisheries and Aquaculture 
A.4.1. Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería - SNP 
The National Fisheries Society is an organization that gathers 61 private enterprises devoted 
to the fishing and aquaculture industry. It is recognized by national state institutions as the 
legitimate representative and advocate of the industrial fishing interests. It was created in 1952 
by a group of entrepreneurs with the aim of fostering the development of the fishmeal and fish 
oil emergent industry. Currently, it is devoted to channel the interests of their members, offer 
technical and legal advice to their associates, promote the research of fisheries, and propose 
norms and legal reforms for the development of fishing activities.4 
 
A.4.2. Federación de Integración y Unificación de los Pescadores Artesanales del Perú 
- FIUPAP 
The Federation of Integration and Unification of Peru´s Artisanal Fishers represents most of 
the social organizations of artisanal fishers in the country. FIUPAP is recognized by the na-
tional state institutions as the legitimate representative and advocate of the artisanal fishers 
and small-scale fishing and aquaculture interest. It was created in 1991 by a group of artisanal 
fishers of the marine environment from different regions with the aim of fostering the develop-
ment and the promotion of artisanal activities and to defend their interests. Currently, it is de-
voted for the defense of their members’ access to fisheries, the promotion of facilities for the 
development of their activities, and the proposal of norms and legal reforms in benefit of their 
members.  
 
A.4.3. Organización Social de Pescadores Artesanales - OSPA 
Social Organizations of Artisanal Fishers (OSPAs) represents local groups of artisanal fishers 
and fish farmers that gather around a variety of common interests. These organizations have 
different profiles regarding their aims, origins and representativity. Overall, they can be gath-
ered in two general types: (i) those with a union nature, devoted mainly to the rights defense 
and that offer social assistance to their members; and (ii) those with a productive nature, de-
voted mainly to the joint development of productive activities or entrepreneurial initiatives. The 
OSPAs are recognized by the state as legitimate spokespersons of local fishers’ groups. 
It is important to highlight that the mentioned way for fishers to organize has not always 
been the only one. This way emerged as part of the government´s growing concern with mak-
ing artisanal fishers visible to state regulatory and taxation practices. Reports from colonial 
                                                          
4 According to their statute. Available online: https://snp.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ESTATUTO-FINAL-
2011.pdf. 
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times, stated that fishers took advantage of their legal status as Indians to organize themselves 
as gremios and defend the access to their activity from other groups (Charney, 2001). Later, 
in the beginning of the 20th century, Fishers mutual aid associations were created with the aim 
to create a clearer and more direct line of organization between local fishing communities and 
a centralized Peruvian state. These associations cared for local ports, aided members in need, 
and served important religious functions. Afterwards, during the 1970s, with the aim to strength 
fishers´ relationship to a corporatist state, unions became the popular way of organizing (Via-
tori and Medina, 2019). However, in 2014, PRODUCE changed its approach and it was de-
cided that artisanal fishers could no longer organize as unions but had to be reclassified as 
associations.  
According to Viatori and Medina (2019) the reasons behind PRODUCE decision was 
that unions were organizations of workers within a company, and therefore artisanal fishers 
could no longer legally be one. In Chorrillos for example, this exacerbated divisions among 
fishers and other stakeholders such as tourist operators. This also created the possibility for 
fishers to organize in multiple associations, which allowed PRODUCE and other state agencies 
to shift from working to one to another depending on the understanding between them. Key 
informants of the region of Ica also stressed during the fieldwork phase in November and De-
cember 2019 the need to reestablish the unity among fishers in order to be able to fight for 
their rights and interests. According to the registry of social organization of artisanal fishers of 
PRODUCE and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, there are 1704 OSPAs in Peru (as of June 
2020). 
 
A.4.4. Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales - NGOs 
Non-Governmental Organizations are nonprofit organizations whose main objective is the pro-
motion of social development, and/or the protection of the marine and coastal environment. 
They are devoted mainly to research policy making, technical and financial assistance, and 
practical issues of conservation of coastal and marine environments. These organizations are 
diverse in terms of their origins, size, financial resources, level of operation and aims. Com-
monly they establish agreements of cooperation with key groups or individuals (state, civil so-
ciety or business groups) according to the specific goals of their program. Some of the more 
relevante NGOs working in the marine-coastal environments of Peru are: Oceana, Pro Delphi-
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B – FISHERIES GOVERNANCE  
 
B.1. Legal Framework and Instruments 
Fishing in Peru is currently regulated by the DL N° 25977 [1992] General Fisheries Law (GFL), 
published on December 1992 during the first government of A. Fujimori (1990-1995). This law 
aims to regulate the use of hydrobiological resources taken into consideration the optimization 
of the economy in balance with the conservation of biodiversity. The first management scheme 
of the GFL was issued through the DS N° 01-1994-PE in 1994 during the same government, 
but was replaced in 2001 by the DS N° 012-2001-PE during the government of Valentín 
Paniagua (Figure 4). Since their entry into force, they have been modified on various occa-
sions. These norms seek to promote the sustainable development of fishing activities and are 
partially aligned with non-binding international instruments such as the FAO Code of Conduct 
for Responsible (FAO, 1995) or the fishing Capacity Management Plan (FAO, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Peruvian fisheries legislation. In dark grey the laws (i.e. the first two general fisheries law of 
the country) and the management schemes (i.e. the first management scheme of the current general fishing law) 
no longer in place. In light grey the laws and management schemes currently in place.  
Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
 
The GFL classifies fishing extraction into two main groups: commercial extraction, that is, for 
sale and purchase purposes; and non-commercial, which may be for scientific research, rec-
reational fishing or for subsistence (for domestic consumption or barter, without profit)5. Within 
commercial fisheries, two types of fisheries are distinguished according to the capacity of the 
vessels and its level of mechanization: 1. artisanal or small-scale and 2. large-scale (also 
known as industrial fishing).  It is considered artisanal when carried out by a natural or legal 
artisanal person with a vessel (i.e. embarked fisheries) or without vessels (i.e. non-embarked 
fisheries). In the case of embarked fisheries, the vessels must have a max 32.6 m3 of hold 
capacity, up to 15m in length and the labor must be predominantly manual. Is considered 
small-scale fisheries when carried out with vessels of max 32.6 m3 of hold capacity but that 
are equipped with modern equipment and fishing systems and whose extractive activity does 
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not have the status of artisanal fishing activity. 2. Is considered large-scale when fishing is 
carried out by vessels of more than 32.6 m3 of hold capacity (see annex I).6 
The management scheme of the GFL states that both types of commercial fisheries 
must be regulated as separate units through fishing regulation schemes, known as ROP (Re-
glamento de Ordenamiento Pesquero). In general, the ROPs are for specific species (see Fig-
ure 5), and only in some cases they regulate a set of fisheries in specific territorial areas, such 
as ROPs for the Amazon, Tumbes and Titicaca basin. According to their objectives, the ROPs 
define the access to fishing, the capacity of the fleets, the fishing seasons, fishing quotas, 
minimum sizes, fishing gear and methods allowed, territorial restrictions, research require-
ments, and monitoring and surveillance actions. However, not all species/fisheries have a 
ROP; for those their fishery needs to be regulated by the rules contained in the management 
scheme of the GFL and other applicable provisions (art.3.). It is worth noting that although the 
GFL orders the development of ROPs, there is no criteria established to which species/fisher-
ies should be prioritize, neither a deadline for PRODUCE to elaborate at least the ones of the 
main commercial fisheries. 
 
 
Figure 5. Type of fishing regulation schemes (ROP).    Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
 
As a fisheries management tool, the ROPs have been criticized in Peru for not having specific 
objectives and goals in line with the management they propose and for not following an eco-
system approach (Heck, 2015; SPDA, 2019a). It should be noted that with the approval of the 
DS N°012-2001-PE the ROPs replaced the figure of the fishing management plans known as 
PMP (Planes de Manejo Pesquero). The main difference between both two was precisely that 
                                                          
6 DS N° 012-2001-PE 
• ROP of merluza peruana [Merluccius gayi peruanus] DS N° 016-2003-PRODUCE
• ROP of bacalao de profundidad [Dissostichus eleginoides] RM N° 236-2001-PE
• ROP of tuna and similar species DS N° 032-2003-PRODUCE
• ROP of jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi] and caballa [Scomber japonicus peruanus] DS N°
011-2007-PRODUCE
• ROP of macroalgae DS N° 019-2009-PRODUCE
• ROP of anchoveta [Engraulis ringens] for Direct Human Consumption DS N° 01-2010-
PRODUCE
• ROP of anguila [Ophichthus remiger] DS N° 013-2011-PRODUCE
• ROP of pota [Dosidicus gigas] DS N° 014-2011-PRODUCE
• ROP of benthic resources RM N° 502-2019-PRODUCE
By species 
• ROP of the Amazon RM N° 147-2001-PE
• ROP of Tumbes DS N° 023-2005-PRODUCE
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the PMP did propose clear objectives and goals that needed to be periodically evaluated by 
the Ministry of Fisheries7 (today PRODUCE).  
 
B.2. Fishing Access Regimes 
The GFL established that the hydrobiological resources present in Peruvian waters are the 
property of the nation and their use, by both natural and legal persons, requires the granting 
of rights by the state. The rights are four types: 1) concession; 2) authorization; 3) permit; and 
4) license. Regarding fishing, fishing permits authorize natural or legal persons to carry out the 
extraction of the hydrobiological resources in the marine-fishing environment. The authoriza-
tions apply to carry out extractive activities with research purposes, the installation of pro-
cessing plants, and for fleet increase. The concessions are used to grant the administration 
and usufruct of the state´s artisanal fishing infrastructure. The licenses authorize the fishing 
processing plants. Of all these four, authorizations and permits regulate the access to artisanal 
fishing. Of all these four, authorizations and concessions regulate the access to aquaculture 
activities (further explained in section C). The four types of rights are subjected to payments 
except for research activities or artisanal or subsistence fishing8 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Types of access rights to fishing, aquaculture and fishing infrastructure. 
 Permit License Authorization Concession 
Fishing Boat operation. - For fleet increase. 
For research. 
- 
Aquaculture - - In private land. On public land, in-










and usufruct of 
public docks.  
Source: DS N° 012-2001-PE; Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
 
The fishing regulation of the resources depends on their level of exploitation which is define 
after the scientific studies and technical reports carried out by IMARPE. The levels are the 
following: unexploited (i.e. those in which there is no exploitation); underexploited (i.e. when 
there are surpluses despite exploitation); fully exploited (i.e. when the maximum sustainable 
yield of the resource is reached). Moreover, resources can also be declared under recovery 
(i.e. in the event that a resource is affected by the impact of adverse biological and oceano-
graphic conditions on its ecosystem)9 (art.9.). However, in the latest case, the law also estab-
lished the conditions for the exploitation of this type of resources under a provisional regime; 
                                                          
7 art.13. DS N° 01-1994-PE 
8 Título VI GFL.  
9 art.8. Management scheme GFL.  
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and as with the definition of types of fisheries (see subsection B.6.1.) this vague definition 
opened the door to use this “legal trap” to extract the resources (Gutiérrez and Suerio, 2017). 
It is important to highlight that the status of overexploitation was not included in the second 
regulation of the GFL (DS N° 012-2001-PE), but it was considered in the first one (DS N° 01-
1994-PE). The assignment of these classifications to a given fishery is established in the spe-
cies-specific ROPs, but considering that not all species have one, the management scheme 
of the GFL establishes general guidelines (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Classification of fisheries by level of exploitation and access ways. 





The Ministry of Fisheries, today PRODUCE, will promote the investigation of such re-
sources through exploratory and experimental fishing. In this scenario, the right to freely 
dispose of the fishery product may be enjoyed. Those fishing activities can only be done 
in a 6-month period and it exists the possibility to renovate once for another 6 months 







The increase of fleet size is authorized10.  
Fishing permits can be granted. 
 
Fully exploited 
Cease of the fleet increase authorizations and cease of fishing permits. Except in the 
event that the fleet size changes without changing the hold capacity. Only applicable 
for large- and small-scale vessels, or vessel with hold capacity of up to 32.6m3 with 
modern systems and equipment whose extractive activity does not have the condition 
or artisanal fishing activity. 
 
Source: DL N° 25977 [1992]; Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
The process for obtaining an artisanal fishing permit and artisanal fishing vessel permit in the 
marine environment is carried out in the DIREPRO of the corresponding jurisdiction (i.e. the 
respective region, with exception of Lima Metropolitana). To get and artisanal fishers permit 
the procedure consist of the following steps: (i) send an application addressed to the 
DIREPRO, (ii) a copy of the identity document, (iii) a certificate of affiliation to an OSPA, (iv) 
and pay a handling fee; additionally, embarked fishermen must (v) send a copy of the vessel’s 
number of registry (certificado de matricula), and (vi) a copy of the sanitary protocol of the 
vessel. (These standard requirements are subject to some variation at the discretion of re-
sponsible DIREPRO.)  
To obtain the artisanal fishing vessel permit the procedure consists of the following 
(Figure 6): (i) send an application to the General Directorate of Artisanal Fishing (PRODUCE), 
(ii) present the vessels´number of registry where the hold capacity in m3 is specified (except 
                                                          
10 However, the DS N°006-2015-PRODUCE prohibits the construction of any type of fishing vessel, except for 
replacement of another discharged or damaged one. Despite this, there is evidence of an increase unauthorized 
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for vessels with a gross tonnage of less 6.48), (iii) obtain sanitary certification (i.e. proving to 
have followed the respective protocol) from SANIPES, (iv) present the documentation that 
proves the possession or legal ownership of and artisanal vessel, and (v) present the vessel 
owner certificate11.  
 
 
Figure 6. General requirements to obtain an artisanal fishing vessel permit.  
Source: Texto Único de Procedimientos Administrativos – TUPA DIREPRO – Piura, TUPA DIREPRO – ICA.; 
Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
 
The access to this right depends on the obtention of other permits and certificates issued by 
other institutions such as SANIPES and DICAPI, which have their own procedures and re-
quirements12. 
More succinctly, the process for obtaining an industrial permit in the marine environ-
ment is carried out in PRODUCE based in the capital city, Lima. In the case of the anchoveta 
[Engraulis ringens] and sardine [Sardinops sagax], it is important to stress that access is closed 
                                                          
11 TUPA DIREPRO Piura. Again, there is some regional variation to these requirements.  
12 Fishing permits for artisanal fisheries are usually valid for fishing every species, with the exception of those 
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since the species were declared as fully exploited in 1997 (RM N° 781-1997-PE). Access for 
large-scale or industrial vessels is granted by an authorization for fleet increase, but it only 
applies for the substitution of already existing vessels with equal hold capacity - although over 
600 vessels were released from this requirement and admitted in a closed list of formal indus-
trial vessels in 1998 (DL N° 26920 [1998]). In this extractive category, permits for fishing an-
choveta are granted through the allocation of an individual vessel quota (see subsection B.3.1). 
The permit is assigned among formal industrial vessels considering their record of extraction 
and the overall anchoveta fishing quota. Due to the closure anchoveta fishery, the only way of 
getting formal access at the present time is through the purchase of an already authorized 
vessels. Fishing permit holders or owners of industrial vessel must pay a fee for the right of 
extraction, which is 0.43% of the Free on board (FOB) value per ton of fishmeal (DS N° 007-
2019-PRODUCE).    
 
B.3. Extraction Restrictions 
The overexploitation of fisheries is a global phenomenon in which many fish stocks are im-
mersed and as a consequence entire related marine ecosystem are being negatively affected; 
overfishing is accompanied, among many other effects, with habitat destruction, changes in 
species abundance and diversity, and ecosystem function and structure disruption due to 
changes in trophic networks. In this, Peru is no exception; the fishing exploitation of at least 
100 marine species and has been recognized13.Therefore, in the following subsections we will 
present the past and present restrictions to the fisheries of those species that due to its scien-
tifically recognized vulnerable ecological status have been subjected to a serious of regulations 
aiming at increasing their sustainability.  
 
B.3.1. Fishing quotas – the case of the anchoveta 
In the coast of Peru there are two out of three anchoveta population stocks: the northern an-
choveta stock (between 3°S and 15°S in northern Peru) and the southern anchoveta stock 
(from 15°S to the southern limit of the Peruvian maritime domain, also exploited by Chile) 
(Pauly and Tsukayama, 1987; Cirke, 2005). The regulations for the management of both 
stocks has considered their differences, with greater attention towards the north central zone, 
which is the most extensive and which historically has had the highest level of exploitation 
(Kroetz et al., 2016). The southern stock has been managed with fewer restrictions and regu-
lations due to difficulties in coordinating the management with Chile. 
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As mentioned before, these stocks are vital for the production of fishmeal and fish oil. 
This idea of transforming Peruvian waters in a fishmeal industry came up for the first time from 
the producers of bird guano grouped under the Guano Administration Company. Guano pro-
duction was an activity that boom during the 19th century and that relied on deposits from living 
birds whose primary source of food were different species of pelagic fish, especially anchoveta. 
However, at the end of 1930s the guano industry was in crisis and the Guano Administration 
Company came up with the idea to exploit a lower level of the Humboldt Current food chain, 
the anchoveta, and produce fishmeal. Moreover, the exclusively right to fish anchoveta and a 
loan to build a fishmeal plant were granted to the Guano Administration Company. Yet, the 
plan was never materialized.  Interestingly, the first time that fishmeal was produced in Peru 
was with the use of bonito scraps as a result of the decrease in exports after the II World War; 
during this period, Peru had taken over the American market of canned tuna by exporting 
canned bonito but when the war finished, the government of the United States prohibited the 
labelling of bonito as tuna (Viatori and Medina, 2019 p. 43). When bonito was not abundant, 
other fish species (like anchoveta) were used. Since then, Peru´s anchoveta fisheries switched 
from capturing it for food (i.e. direct human consumption - DHC) to capturing it for fishmeal/fish 
oil production (i.e. indirect human consumption - IHC). This was possible mainly because of 1) 
the presence of cheap coastal labor as a direct consequence of an agriculture crisis in the 
highlands that led workers to migrate to the coast in search of work opportunities; 2) that the 
anchoveta populations could be found very close to the shore which made the stocks very 
accessible with the at that time available boat technology; and 3) national pro-export policies 
(Viatori and Medina, 2019 p. 44-45). 
In the 1950s Peru became the largest exporter of fish in the world. But by the mid-
1960s the anchoveta stocks were showing signs of overfishing and the mismatch between the 
growing supply of fishmeal and the inability of the international demand to keep the growing 
pace resulted in indebtedness and bankruptcy of parts of the industry. In 1965 the newly cre-
ated IMARPE partnered with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) in a mission to analyze the anchoveta stocks. The study concluded that the anchoveta 
was fully exploited and at risk of not being able to recover (Clark, 1976). IMARPE made rec-
ommendations to implement the country’s first closed season. That same year, the govern-
ment, for the first time in Peru since the anchoveta industry had started, implemented a series 
of actions aiming at controlling the predation of the resource; among them: a limitation on the 
number of fishing days (i.e. the establishment of “fishing weeks”) and a Total Allowable Catch 
– TAC (LMCTP) for the entire fleet (at that time the GFL, with its distinction between different 
fleets, was not yet implemented) of approximately 7M tons for 1965 (IMARPE, 1965). In prac-
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tice catches exceeded the scientifically recommended quota because 1) the enforcement sys-
tem was not strong enough; 2) the fleet size and the holding capacity kept growing; and 3) with 
the implementation of TAC a shorter fishing season was implied (from 270 days in 1986 to 50 
in 200714); however, few boat owners could afford to tie up their boats when processing plants 
were demanding product to satisfy the international demand. Therefore, these policies ended 
up promoting an “Olympic race” (i.e. referring to the competition between vessels fishing as 
much resource as possible in the shortest time possible). From the onset off, all this generated 
the existence of efficiency problems in the industry since the fleet and the holding capacity of 
vessels and processing plants surpassed the availability of resource (IMARPE, 1970)15. 
In 1968, the military led by Velasco Alvarado overthrew the government. Velasco set 
out to more closely regulate the anchoveta stocks; as a result, a number of laws aiming to 
restructure the fishery industry passed and the Ministry of Fisheries (today PRODUCE) was 
created. In 1972-1973 an ENSO event combined with the past decade of overfishing led to the 
collapse of the anchoveta population (Aranda, 2009). This was the beginning of a long period 
of recession in the catch volumes of anchoveta that did not recover until 1990s (Glantz, 1979; 
Arias Schreiber, 2012). In 1973, a moratorium on anchoveta fishing was imposed for most of 
the country, the four largest companies were nationalized and the Empresa Nacional Pesquera 
Pesca Perú SA (known as Pesca-Peru) was created. Moreover, the fishing and processing 
capacities were reduced (the number of registered boats was halved and roughly the same 
percentage of industry´s workers were laid off), and it was forbidden to build or renew fishing 
vessels (Viatori and Medina, 2019 p.47) with the aim of preventing the anchoveta industry from 
collapse and ensuring its future profitability. However, in 1975 the general Morales Bermúdez 
overthrew Velasco and started the process of re-privatization of the anchoveta industry which 
culminated in the 1990s under the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) with the privat-
ization of Pesca-Peru. 
In the 1980s, almost a decade after the anchoveta crisis, although the anchoveta 
stocks were showing signs of improvement they were still not rebounding; the fishing of new 
species such as the Pacific sardine [Sardinops sagax] was encouraged. This resulted in an 
expansion of overfishing practices to many other species. On top of that, in 1982-1983 another 
ENSO phenomenon led to further anchoveta stocks declines and throughout the 1980s an-
choveta (and other species) fishing seasons were continually affected by closures. In 1990, 
Alberto Fujimori entered the presidential office and organized large-scale re-privatization pro-
cesses for the sake of “efficiency”; in the following decade a number of neoliberal policies were 
                                                          
14 https://www.actualidadambiental.pe/historia-y-balance-como-se-ha-manejado-la-pesca-de-anchoveta-en-el-
peru/ 
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implemented (Aranda, 2009; Ibarra et al., 2000); the government transferred to private hands 
the exclusive right to join a highly profitable activity that bases its activity on the exploitation of 
common property national renewable natural resources and thus lost a significant source of 
potential revenue. At this point everything (e.g. fleet, the processing plants) was private and 
the pelagic stocks were recovering so the private sector found the optimal conditions to invest 
in new vessels and modernization of plants. The fleet expanded even more (Viatori and Me-
dina, 2019 p.52). 
 1992 is the year in which the current GFL (DL N° 25977 [1992]) was issued and when 
the management of the anchoveta fisheries starts getting more complicated. As mentioned, 
the enactment of the GFL implied a distinction of different fleets (i.e. artisanal and small-scale 
and large-scale). However, how this type of fleets, and therefore fisheries, are defined changed 
from the first management scheme of the law (approved in 1994) to the current one (approved 
in 2001). The first one defined the commercial marine artisanal and small-scale fisheries as 
the one carried out without boats and the one carried out with boats of up to 30 metric tons of 
hold capacity; and large-scale fishery as the one carried out by vessels of more than 30 metric 
tons of hold capacity (note that it is not the actual 32.6m3). Another important point established 
with the GFL was the distinction of hydrobiological products into those destined for direct hu-
man consumption (DHC) and for indirect human consumption (IHC) (art.22.). The GFL also 
required that owners decommission old boats before new ones could be commissioned (for 
the anchoveta). However, this was not a requirement for the commission of vessels for other 
species which at the end were used to access the anchoveta fishery. 
The GFL was the first legislation to define ‘artisanal fishery’. However, authors have 
pointed to the double standards of the government; on one hand implementing neoliberal pol-
icies to benefit private interest and on the other hand adding some populist measures looking 
for support from the country´s poor. In 1992, another decree was approved that established 
the exclusivity of fishing in the 0 – 5 nautical miles to the artisanal/small-scale fleet (but keeping 
in mind the definition that was on place in 1992 which is not the current one) and prohibited 
the use of purse seine nets in this zone (DS N° 017-1992-PE). The large-scale fleet did not 
oppose this norm probably because it came with a low likelihood of enforcement due to lack 
of resources and funding. Although these measures have been historically used as the legal 
bases for advocating for artisanal fishers´ rights they ignore the fact that artisanal fisheries not 
only fish in nearshore waters (the ones most polluted at that time as a consequence of the 
sewage of the fishmeal processing plants) (Viatori and Medina, 2019 p.52-53).  
In 1998 the DL N° 26920 [1998] was enacted. This law aimed to formalize the fisheries 
activity by establishing that the owners of wooden vessels with a hold capacity of up to 110m3 
and that had been practicing the activity could ask for a fishing permit without the need to be 
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authorized for the increasing of the fleet. This fleet started to be known as Vikingas. In 2000, 
the fleet targeting anchoveta was five times larger than needed to catch the TAC (Viatori and 
Medina, 2019, p.54). In 2001, with the DS N° 012-2001-PE the definition of the artisanal/small-
scale and large-scale fisheries changed (as mentioned above).  
Focusing on the historical development of what today is a key mechanism regulating 
the fishing access of anchoveta for IHC, the individual vessel quota (IVQ), we see that in 1992, 
the World Bank promoted the implementation of a system of individual transferable quotas 
(ITQ) similar to those that had already been operative in Iceland, New Zealand and Canada 
for some decades (Young and Lankester, 2013). However, it was not appealing for the Peru-
vian government or boat owners connected to fishmeal production. Years later, the proposal 
was still at the center of discussion; for instance, in 2002, the Vice-Ministry of Fisheries (former 
Ministry of Fisheries) proposed the introduction of an ITQ system in the fishery for anchoveta 
and sardine and in 2003 a new fisheries administration confirmed to the local media the gov-
ernment’s willingness to implement an ITQ scheme from 2004.  
In June 2008, the government finally took the decision to introduce an IVQ system- IVQ 
(LMCE). During Alan García Pérez´s second term as president (2006-2011); the DL N° 1084 
[2008] (Ley sobre límites máximos de captura por embarcación) was enacted. The quotas 
were granted to fish anchoveta for IHC between the northern limit with Ecuador and parallel 
16° S, and outside the reserve areas for the artisanal and small-scale fleet. In the second 
season of that same year, the system was extended to the southern zone. This system was 
distinguished from the one initially proposed by the World Bank (i.e. ITQ) with respect to trad-
ability of fishing rights (Aranda, 2009). Unlike ITQ that can be sold and bought, accumulated 
and relocated to other vessels, IVQ are attached to the vessel itself and the fishing license; 
they are only awarded to authorized boats and the only way to access them is through the 
purchase of an authorized vessel. In the Peruvian case, the quotas were awarded differently 
for the large-scale vessels and the Vikinga fleet. For the former, 60% of the quota is estimated 
from the best catching year since 2004 and the remaining 40% from the licensed hold capacity 
of the vessel. For the latter, 100% of the quota is estimated based on the best year of catches 
since 2004. The DL N° 1084 [2008] does not clearly specify the rationale behind the decision 
to use different criteria for the two fleets (Aranda, 2009) but there were disagreements between 
the National Society of Fisheries (SNP; the most representative association for the large-scale 
sector) and the National Association of Boatowners of the Law 26920 [1998] (Asociación 
nacional de armadores pesqueros ley 26920; the most representative association of the Vi-
kinga fleet) (Viatori and Medina, 2019 p.54). The National Society of Fisheries supported the 
implementation of IVQ while the National Association of Boatowners preferred a vessel buy-
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the TAC recommended for each fishing season by IMARPE. The IVQ is flexible as it is subject 
to re-adjustments based on the catches recorded by the vessels over time and that, if not used 
at least once every two years, can be reversed by PRODUCE.  
The IVQ system did not include any measure for mandatory or voluntary boat decom-
missioning, effectively maintaining the Peruvian fleet capacity. If a given boat owner decides 
to decommission a boat, its rights can be added onto other boats belonging to the same owner.  
The payment for the IVQ is particular for the anchoveta of IHC; taxes are not assigned on the 
weight of the extraction or capture but on the weight of processed product in FOB. In July 2019 
it was established that the payment for the IVQ for anchoveta of IHC will be calculated on the 
basis of applying 0.43% of the FOB value of fishmeal16. 
The IVQ system together with the relatively good status of the anchoveta stocks and 
the increasing demand for fishmeal/fish oil and its price, encouraged small-scale and artisanal 
fishers to illegally harvest anchoveta for fishmeal within the five nautical miles to sell it to the 
black-market. As we have mentioned, since the production of fishmeal/fish oil became very 
relevant for the Peruvian market economy, the fishing of anchoveta started to be regulated 
differently depending on its final destination. But it was not until 2010 when the first ROP of 
the resource of anchoveta for DHC was approved (DS N° 010-2010-PRODUCE); this man-
agement scheme was also regulating the extraction of another type of anchoveta, samasa 
[Anchoa nasus].  
In 2012, under the presidency of Humala (2011-2016) and for the first time in history, 
the minister of PRODUCE was not someone from the fishmeal industry. As a result, the DS N° 
005-2012 aiming to develop a domestic market for anchoveta as food fish was enacted. This 
DS changed the definition for artisanal and small-scale fisheries of the GFL; the artisanal fleet 
is the one of no more than 10m3 of hold capacity with manual work and the small-scale fleet is 
the one of 10-32.5m3 of hold capacity, no more than 15m in length and preferably equipped 
with modern equipment and fishing systems and whose extractive activity does not have the 
status of artisanal fishing activity. The main regulation was that the artisanal fleet (i.e. <10 m3) 
could exclusively fish anchoveta for DHC in the first 5 miles; the wooden purse seines (boli-
ches. i.e. 10-32.5m3) could not fish anchoveta closer than 5 nautical miles and only 10% of 
their catches were licensed for fishmeal (the rest had to go to canning). The large industrial 
fleet (i.e > 32.5m3) could not fish closer than ten nautical miles for anchoveta that would be 
processed into fishmeal. This DS was accused to be unconstitutional by the industrialists (led 
by the National Society of Fisheries) and indeed, in November 2013, Peru´s Supreme Court 
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declared the DS N° 005-2012 unconstitutional arguing that the reservation of areas was a 
violation of the art.9. of the GFL (i.e. new regulations have to be based on clear scientific data 
and socioeconomic factors) as this data had not been provided. As a response, PRODUCE 
issued several other DS (e.g. DS N° 011-2013) to try to reassert the geographical limits. How-
ever, this fight came to an end in 2016 with the election of a new government which again 
aimed to benefit the fishmeal industry. That same year, PRODUCE pre-published a project for 
a new ROP for DHC anchoveta.  
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of the anchoveta fishery according to fleets and marine areas. Nowadays generally the indus-
trial fleet can only fish anchoveta for indirect human consumption (i.e. fishmeal/ fish oil) from five miles onwards; 
while the artisanal and small-scale fleet can only fish for direct human consumption from the three miles onwards. 
The fishing of anchoveta is not legally allow within 3 miles. The mentioned regulations do not apply to the Tumbes 
coast; in this case, the fishing of anchoveta can only be carried out 5 miles onwards.  
Source: adaptated from Peru Oceana17; elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
The project aimed to: (i) again redefined the artisanal and small-scale fleet; now with criteria 
that do not focus on the size of the fleet or the hold capacity but that are based on the use or 
not of mechanized means to carry out the fishing operations; (ii) forbid the fishing of anchoveta 
in the first 3 nautical miles to any fleet; and (iii) obligatory implementation of satellite systems 
in the DHC fleet18. In 2017 these became enacted under the new ROP for anchoveta for DHC 
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(DS N° 005-2017-PRODUCE). Furthermore, with its approval for the first time a quota for an-
choveta for DHC was granted. Before the artisanal and small-scale fleet could fish anchoveta 
for DHC throughout the year without limits19. Currently the ROP establishes that artisanal or 
smaller-scale vessels – must operate outside the 3 nautical miles (see Figure 7, above). 
 
B.3.2. Fishing quotas – the case of other species 
As shown in Table 4, in addition to the anchoveta for IHC other species for which a total allow-
able catch (TAC) was defined are: the hammerhead shark – tiburón martillo [Sphyrna 
zygaena], eel- anguila [Ophichthus remiger], bigeye tune – atún patudo [Thunnus obesus], cod 
of the deep – bacalao de profundidad [Dissostichus eleginoides], mackerel – caballa and jurel 
respectively [Scomber japonicus peruanus; Trachurus picturatus murphyi], Peruvian hake – 
merluza peruana [Merluccius gayi peruanus], species of kelp - aracanto [Lessonia trabeculata], 
eastern Pacific bonito - bonito [Sarda chiliensis chiliensis]. From those, the species with current 
ROPs are five: Peruvian hake, cod of the deep, mackerel, anchoveta and eel. But of these 
only the Peruvian hake and the anchoveta (for IHC) have IVQ. In some cases, the TAC applies 
to all types of vessels (as is the case of the mackerels), i.e. being accessible to all fishing 
fleets. In others, the quota is specific to a single fishing fleet, for example the species of kelp, 
whose quota is restricted to the artisanal fishing fleet.   
Table 4. Species for which an access regime based on a total allowable catch (TAC) and/or individual vessel 
quota (IVQ) systems were defined. IHD = Indirect human consumption, DHC = Direct human consumption. 
Species TAC system IVQ System 
Anchoveta [Engraulis ringens] IHC     
Anchoveta [Engraulis ringens] DHC    
Pota [Dosidicus gigas]     
Bacalao de profundidad [Dissostichus eleginoides]     
Merluza peruana [Merluccius gayi peruanus]      
Atún patudo [Thunnus obesus]   
Jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi]     
Caballa [Scomber japonicus peruanus]    
Anguila [Ophichthus remiger]     
Tiburón martillo [Sphyrna zygaena]    
Aracanto [Lessonia trabeculata]    
Bonito [Sarda chiliensis chiliensis]    
Macroalgae   
Source: MardelPeru20; Elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
Most of the time, the establishment of the quotas is a domestic matter in which only the com-
petent state institutions have interferences, however, in a few cases the establishment of the 
                                                          
19 https://peru.oceana.org/es/blog/claves-para-entender-el-manejo-de-la-pesqueria-de-anchoveta 
20 https://www.mardelperu.pe/pesca/3/reglas-de-juego-en-el-sector-pesca 
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quotas responds to a supranational organization to which the country is attached. This would 
be the case of the Atún Tropical. The Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission (CIAT) estab-
lishes a global fishing quota that is distributed among each of the 18-member countries. Then 
this national quota is distributed to users by each state through public competition; the winners 
of the fishing rights are those who offer the highest value per ton of catch. It is also the case 
of the bacalao de profundidad [Dissostichus eleginoides], which is managed under the Com-
mission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCRVMA) to which Peru 
is not a member and has not sign the agreement. Finally, it is also the case of the jurel [Tra-
churus picturatus murphyi]. The management for this species is currently under the South Pa-
cific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO) and the Peruvian government.  
This resource is highly migratory and therefore is distributed among many fishing ar-
eas; both national and international waters. In the early 2000s Chile was worried about the 
sustainability of this resource, which constitutes one of its most important fisheries, and tried 
that Ecuador, Peru and Colombia (with which the Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur is 
formed), implement strict measures that impede or hinder the operation of foreign fleets that 
were carrying out IUU (i.e. illegal, unreported and unregulated). However, any measures were 
agreed, and in 2006 Chile decided to find support in other countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand; this way the formation of the SPRFMO started. In the first meetings Peru was not 
involved, and it was in 2007 when the National Fisheries Association (SNP) took part in one of 
the meetings and realized the importance of being an active member of SPRFMO; as the 
sovereignty of the management of this resource was at risk. As a result, Peru created a tech-
nical working group formed by IMARPE, PRODUCE, DICAPI and the SNP.  
There are three main conflicts between Peru and the other countries of SPRFMO: First, 
Peru declared the existence of two different stocks of jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi]; one 
in what would be its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and its surrounding high seas; and a 
second one in Chile and its high seas. Here, it is important to consider that Peru has not signed 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both the constitution of the 
Republic (art.54.) and the GFL (art.7.) state that the fishing laws are applicable beyond the 
200-miles zone in accordance with international agreements. In contrast, the other countries 
(apart from Russia that declared the existence of four stocks) supported the idea of the exist-
ence of one single stock. Second, the rest of the countries defended that the establishment of 
the annual quotas had to be based on the historic fishing records of the vessels that would 
have traditionally fished in the high seas of the South Pacific. However, Peru felt it was at a 
disadvantage as it did not have jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi] fishing fleet for the high 
seas. Third, the intention of the SPRFMO was to regulate the resource in what they called 
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the Peruvian state a clear violation of the sovereignty of the coastal nation. Peru strongly op-
posed the formulation but was left alone in its political stance (Ecuador and Colombia never 
had a leading role and Chile aligned with the position of the other countries for strategic con-
venience). However, Peru made the cessation of sovereignty over its jurisdictional waters 
(art.20 of the SPRFMO convention) dependent on its explicit consent:  
“Con el consentimiento expreso del Estado costero parte o partes concernido, la Comisión 
puede establecer de acuerdo con el Anexo III de esta Convención, según corresponda una 
cuota total de captura o un esfuerzo máximo permisible que aplique a todo el rango de dis-
tribución del recurso pesquero. 
En caso que uno o más de los Estados costeros partes no consienta que una cuota total de 
captura o un esfuerzo pesquero máximo permisible se aplique a todo el rango de distribución 
del recurso pesquero, la Comisión puede establecer según corresponda, una cuota total de 
captura o un esfuerzo pesquero máximo permisible que aplique en las áreas de jurisdicción 
nacional de los Estados costeros parte o partes que sí dieron su consentimiento y en el área 
de la Convención.”  
In this way Peru preferred to renounce the fishing it had carried out in its jurisdictional waters 
to be counted for the determination of the quota, rather than relinquishing its sovereignty and 
allowing those measure to be applied therein (Inurritegui and Mutsios, 2019). 
 
B.3.3. Minimum catch sizes and maximum tolerance index 
The minimum catch size refers to the minimum size with which a certain species is considered 
to have reached maturity, having had the opportunity to spawn at least once. The definition of 
minimum catch size aims to facilitate the sustainable exploitation of marine resources by con-
stituting a parameter based on the average spawning size to allow the reproduction and re-
newal of the species. These measures are defined based on scientific studies carried out by 
IMARPE. In most cases the minimum sized are expressed in units of length, the exception 
being the case of the octopus whose size is expressed in weight.  
The minimum catch size is the basis for defining the characteristics of the length of the 
nets that must be used according to the target species and the fishing gear, with the aim to 
achieve the greatest selectivity as possible during the catch (see Table 5). Considering the 
difficulty of this, the regulations consider a maximum tolerance index of juveniles that define 
the maximum allowable percentage of bycatch. In general, the permitted bycatch rates are 
between 10 and 20%, with the exception of the mackerels (caballa [Scomber japonicus] and 
jurel [Trachurus murphyi]) which is set at 30%.  
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B.3.4. Exclusion zones 
The exclusion or reserve zones, are areas in which a certain type of extraction is restricted: 
this could be either the artisanal, small-scale, or large-scale fishing fleet or the use of certain 
gears or fishing practices. 
B.3.4.1. Exclusion zones by type of fishing: artisanal, small-scale and large-scale 
The creation of fishing exclusion zones in Peru dates back to the first decades of the 19th 
century. One of the first restrictions was established by the Guano Administration Company in 
1916. It prohibited fishing boats from approaching guaneras islands at distances less than one 
mile; a distance that was extended to two miles in 1922 in order to preserve in good conditions 
the habitat of the guano birds and therefore to maintain the production of fertilizers21. 
 
Table 5. Overview of fishing gears, corresponding targeted species and respectively established minimum sizes 
for the Peruvian fishery. 
Fishing 
gear 





Anchoveta [Engraulis ringens] 13 mm (½ in.) 
Sardina [Sardinops sagax] 38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi], Caballa [Scomber 
japonicus peruanus] 
38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Lorna [Sciaena deliciosa], Cabinza [Isacia conceptionis], 
Machete [Ethmidium maculatum], Lisa [Mugil cephalus] 
38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Bonito [Sarda chiliensis chiliensis], Cojinova [Seriolella 
violacea guichenot], Sierra [Pristis pristis]22 
76 mm (3 in.) 
Atunes  110 mm 
Barriletes [Katsuwonus pelamis] 110 mm 
Gill nets 
(cortina) 
Pejerrey [Odontesthes regia] 38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Lorna [Sciaena deliciosa], Cabinza [Isacia conceptionis], 
Machete [Ethmidium maculatum], Lisa [Mugil cephalus] 
38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Sardina [Sardinops sagax] 38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Tiburones  200 - 330 mm 
Raya águila, raya manta, raya basha 200 – 330 mm 




Merluza peruana [Merluccius gayi peruanus], and ac-
companying bottom fauna  
110 mm 
Jurel [Trachurus picturatus murphyi], Caballa [Scomber 
japonicus peruanus] 
76 mm (3 in.) 
Langostinos 38 mm (1 ½ in.) 
Source: RM N° 209-2001-PE; elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
 
Currently the first 5 miles of the Peruvian coast have an exclusion regime that aims to protect 
the upwelling zones and the reproductive areas of the hydrobiological resources. In September 
1992, the DS N° 017-1992-PE, established that the area between 0 and 5 nautical miles would 
                                                          
21 RS 2 May 1916. Prohibición a los botes pesqueros de acercarse a las islas guaneras, a distancia menor de 
una milla. 
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be declared a zone of protection of flora and fauna, prohibiting fishing with purse seines (either 
for DHC and IHC) and other fishing gears that could modify the bioecological conditions of the 
environment. Endorsing this rule, the management scheme of the 1994 GFL (DS N° 01-1994-
PE) established that the first 5 nautical miles would be reserved for artisanal and small-scale 
fishing, prohibiting the exercise of fishing from the large-scale fleet. Within this area, the use 
of fishing gear that could alter the conditions of the environment (in particular [bottom] trawls 
and mechanized beach seines) were forbidden. Later, the new management scheme of 2001, 
indicated that large-scale vessels could eventually extract resources within 5 miles following 
IMARPE evaluation23 and that the use of artisanal purse seines was feasible, with the excep-
tion of the coastal area of Tumbes.  
A special mention should be made to the coastal area of the department of Tumbes, 
which has had its own ROP since 2005 (DS N° 023-2005-PRODUCE). The ROP regulates 
small-scale and artisanal extractive activities in the maritime area adjacent to the department 
and limits the activity inside the 5 nautical miles. More specifically, in the 5 nautical miles fish-
eries can only make use of selective gear and fishing practices (such as gill nets, cast nets, 
hand lines, long lines, traps, harpoon, diving, hunt and gathering). At the same, it excludes the 
use of purse seines for both artisanal and small-scale vessels, being an exemption to what is 
established by the ROP for the anchoveta to DHC.  
 
B.3.4.2. Spatial exclusion: conservation exclusion zones and protected areas 
Currently there are three national reserves that include marine areas: the Paracas national 
reserve (1975), the national reserve Sistema de Islas, Islotes y Puntas Guaneras (2009) and 
the San Fernando national reserve (2011). In addition, there are two proposals to create the 
national reserve Mar Tropical de Grau, which would include 4 areas located off the coast of 
Tumbes and Piura and would occupy an area of approximately 116,000 ha24, and the national 
reserve Dorsal de Nasca, which would be located off the coast of Ica, extending over 62 
392.0575 km2 25. If both projects materialize, they would be the first national reserves located 
exclusively in the marine environment, since the above-mentioned reserves all include coastal 
land.  
The creation of these areas has as its main objective the conservation of biodiversity 
and the marine-coastal landscapes; it allows economic activities such as fishing and tourism 
to be carried out, but with restrictions. Its exercise is subject to what is established by the 
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zoning of the areas, which assigns the possible uses in the territory in ways that the conser-
vation of the environment and the use of its resources can be balanced. Each area has its own 
criteria for identification and zoning, defining among other: areas for wild use, direct use, re-
covery, strict protection, or special use.   
In general, the areas of wild use and strict protection restrict the use of hydrobiological 
resources, including the types of fishing allowed, in order not to alter the dynamics of the spe-
cies. These areas also tend to restrict the entry of tourist boats, while research activities are 
subject to evaluation by the reserves’ authorities.  
In the marine areas that are part of protected natural areas, only artisanal and small-
scale fishing is allowed, while larger-scale is prohibited. Mariculture can be conducted through 
the allocation and granting of special concessions. In all cases, the exploitation of resources 
must be in accordance with the objectives of conservation of the ecosystems and landscapes 
of the area and the other national/regional management schemes on place. For this, the activ-
ities carried out must be approved by SERNANP – who has a binding opinion – and have the 
necessary authorizations (e.g. fishing permits, vessel registry, etc.).  
 
B.3.5. Temporary restrictions: temporal closures 
The closures are prohibitions of the capture or extraction of resources in a given space and 
time; in this sense, the closures can be periodic (i.e. repeated every year in the same season), 
occasional (e.g. anchoveta, merluza, anguila, bacalao de profundidad, bagre, chiri, caballa, 
jurel, etc.), and permanent (i.e. applied to protected species) (SPDA, 2019b). In addition, clo-
sures can apply to the entire territory or to a specific marine area (in which case, it is estab-
lished at the province level). 
Periodic closures aim at avoiding the capture of species during their maturation and/or 
reproduction process and occur every few months of the year. Some species of coastal marine 
areas that have temporal closures are: camarón de río [Cryphiops caementarius] (20th Dec- 
31st Mar), hammer shark [Sphyrna zygaena] (1st Jan – 10th Mar), mangrove crabs [Ucides 
occidentalis] (15th Jan – 28th Feb & 15th Aug – 30th Sep), concha negra [Anadara tuberculosa]   
(15th Feb – 31st Mar), Lorna [Sciaena deliciosa] (1st Apr – 30th Apr), Ispi [Orestias spp] (1st Mar 
– 30th Apr & 1st Sep – 31st Oct), trucha acoiris [Oncorhynchus mykiss] (1st Apr – 31st Jul), 
Chanque/Tolina [Concholepas concholepas] (1st Apr – 30th June & 1st Oct – 31st Dec), 
Perico/dorado [Coryphaena hippurus] (1st May – 30th Sep), Pejerrey Argentino [Odontesthes 
bonariensis] (1st Aug – 31st Oct), Paiche [Arapaima gigas] (1st Oct – 28th Feb), Boquichico 
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Dec), Arahuana [Osteoglossum bicirrhosum]  (1st Dec – 15th Mar) and Langostino de mar [Pe-
naeus vannamei]  (16th Dec – 15th Feb)26. The mentioned closed periods could change accord-
ing to IMARPE recommendations.  
Permanent closures aim to recover species considered endangered in order to guar-
antee their survival, the end of the closure period is subject to the recovery of the resource. 
Some species with permanent closures are: dolphins and minor cetaceans (Law 26585 [1996] 
& DS N° 002-1996-PE), the giant manta ray (RM N° 441-2015-PRODUCE), the sea horse (RM 
N° 306-2004-PRODUCE), sea turtles (RM N° 103-1995-PE), whale shark (RM N° 331-2017-
PRODUCE) and sea lion (RM N° 103-76-PE)27. 
In general, closures at the level of the entire territory are imposed on fishing resources 
with a greater mobility, such as pelagic and demersal fish, and apply to all specimens at the 
national level (but for the anchoveta). The exceptions to this rule are the closure of the cangrejo 
violáceo [Platyxanthus orbignyi] (RM N° 159-2009-PRODUCE), cangrejo peludo (RM N° 159-
2009-PRODUCE), cangrejo jaiva (RM N° 159-2009-PRODUCE).  
This type of closure, however, is disputed by fishers who point out to behavior differ-
ences of certain species throughout the territory; suggesting that differentiated units can be 
found along the ocean and therefore further studies are needed. This is for instance the case 
of the langostino café [Farfantepenaeus californiensis], in the north of Peru. In 2004 through 
the RM N°305-2004-PRODUCE, the extraction of langostino (including: langostino blanco [Li-
topenaeus vannamei & Litopenaeus occidentalis], langostino azul  [Litopenaeus stylirostris], 
langostino café  [Farfantepenaeus californiensis], langostino rojo  [Farfantepenaeus breviros-
tris], langostino cebra  [Rimapenaeus fuscina], langostino pomada  [Xiphopenaeus riveti and 
Protrachypene precipua], langostino duro  [Sicyonia disdorsalis and Sicyonia aliaffinis] and 
langostino de profundidad  [Haliporoides diomedeae]) was subjected to temporal restrictions 
in the regions of Tumbes and Piura. This was the result of a technical report of IMARPE (Nº 
PCD-100-139-2004-PRODUCE/IMP – Situación del Recurso Langostino en la Región Tum-
bes) in which it was explained that the volumes had been reduced since the 2000s due to its 
fisheries boom after the ENSO 1997/97; and that the companies were not following the sanitary 
standards resulting in the presence of white spot syndrome virus. However, fishers from Piura 
stated that the stocks of the langostino café [Farfantepenaeus californiensis] present for in-
stance in Sechura Bay are a different one that the one in Tumbes. In 2016, IMARPE published 
the report Aspectos del periodo reproductivo del langostino café en la Región Piura through 
which concluded the no presence of mature specimens of the langostino café in the coast of 
Piura but that in order to understand the causes of this, the studies have to continue and 
                                                          
26 https://pescayconsumoresponsable.produce.gob.pe/vedas.html 
27 http://www.minam.gob.pe/educacion/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2015/02/2.5.-PRODUCE-tallas-de-pesca.pdf 
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therefore the fishing. As a result, through the RM N° 486-2016-PRODUCE, the extraction of 
the langostino café [Farfantepenaeus californiensis] was authorized (anyway, the extraction 
must always finish once the biological indicators indicate that the species is starting its repro-
ductive activity). In addition, IMARPE is since 2018 conducting exploratory fishery of this re-
sources and is studying the environmental impact of different fishing gears.  
On the other hand, closures that are for specific areas are generally imposed on fishing 
resources with little range of mobility, such as benthic resources, for example the prohibition 
of the extraction of the sea urchin/erizo [Loxechinus albus] in the province of Marcona since 
2007 (RM N°100-2006-PRODUCE), the one for macha [Mesodesma donacium] in Arequipa, 
Moquegua and Tacna (RM N° 099-1999-PE) or the one for the octopus in Lamabayeque and 
Piura (RM N° 483-2009; RM N° 482-2011-PRODUCE)28. 
 
B.4. Surveillance and Sanctioning Systems 
The system of control and of infractions and sanctions is defined by the RISPAC - Reglamento 
de Fiscalización y Sanción de las Actividades Pesqueras y Acuícola (DS N° 017-2017-
PRODUCE). The controling and sanctioning tasks are carried out by the Dirección General de 
Supervisión, Fiscalización y Sanciones of PRODUCE and DIREPRO, supported by DICAPI 
and the National Police (PNP), depending on the territorial jurisdiction in which the actions are 
carried out. These institutions have the power to supervise and sanction extractive, processing 
and commercialization activities of fisheries and aquaculture, having unrestricted access to 
any space where the activity is carried out (landing sites, processing plants, transport units, 
etc.). The infractions are classified into: general infractions; infractions related to: the pro-
cessing, transport, commercialization and storage; to foreign vessels and recreational fishing; 
to the Amazon and Titicaca Basin ROPs; to the tuna fisheries; and to macroalgae.  
Broadly speaking, the infractions related to the extractive activity are: fishing without a 
permit or authorization; the extraction of resources in prohibited areas or periods; diverting 
hydrobiological resources reserved to the DHC to the industrial production (i.e. IHC); exceed-
ing the bycatch percentages and allowable tolerance indices as well as authorized volumes; 
obstructing the access to information, regarding the extraction of juveniles and bycatch and 
fish volumes, to the supervising entities; extracting resources with fishing gears or methods 
not allowed (e.g. dynamite, or toxic compounds); not having a satellite tracking system 
(SISESAT) or not having it operational and operating; and landing of fisheries products in un-
authorized areas. 
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According to the severity of infractions, PRODUCE or DIREPRO can apply four types 
of administrative sanctions: (i) fines; (ii) the confiscation of products or assets that are the 
subject of infringements; (iii) the suspension of the rights to exercise the activity; and (iv) the 
cancellation of administrative rights, the reduction of the IVQ or aquaculture areas. The calcu-
lation of fines considers the following factors: the fine expressed in UIT - Unidad Impositiva 
Tributaria, the level of illicit benefit, the probability of detection and aggravating factors (recid-
ivism, harm to third parties, extraction of fully exploited, recovering or protected resources, 
threat or violence against the inspectors) and mitigating factors (informs about the infraction 
and accepts the fine, adopts corrective measures to reduce the damage, does not present a 
record) (art.34. - DS N° 017-2017-PRODUCE). 
 In 2018, a norm that legislated the interdiction actions for illegal fishing (DL N° 
1393[2018]) or "the scrapping (disablement), confiscation or destruction of boats, machinery 
or equipment used for the development of illegal fishing”29 was issued. These are sanctioning 
actions that do not replace administrative sanctions, but rather complement them and that are 
carried out by the Peruvian National Police or by DICAPI. The norm defines illegal fishing as 
“any activity that affects or may affect hydrobiological resources that are carried out in breach 
of the regulations on the matter, be it administrative or criminal”30,  considering as such: the 
construction, installation or operation of a) shipyards without a qualifying title; b) boats without 
authorization to increase the fleet; c) of fish processing plants without authorization or license; 
and, unauthorized landing points; d) the extraction of resources with a boat without a fishing 
permit; e) the use, transportation or possession of unauthorized fishing gear and / or explosives 
or toxic substances. 
 Certain practices of illegal fishing are also criminalized in the Peruvian penal code, 
establishing penalties involving deprivation of liberty ranging from three to seven years in the 
case of aggravated crimes. It is considered as crime and not only infraction: the illegal traffick-
ing of aquatic species of wild flora and fauna, which includes the acquisition, sale, transport, 
storage, import or export of species: without license, in closure, juveniles and/or reserve ar-
eas31 and the illegal extraction of aquatic species, considering species in closed season, juve-
niles, that exceed the IVQ, that are not licensed, or that have been extracted using illegal 
methods32. It is considered aggravating crime when the species come from natural protected 
areas, closure areas or as protected species33. Falsehood in the report of captured fishing 
volumes is also considered a crime.  
                                                          
29 https://www.actualidadambiental.pe/emiten-decretos-para-combatir-la-pesca-ilegal-e-iniciar-un-nuevo-proceso-
de-formalizacion/ 
30 art. 3, Cap III, DL 1393. 
31 art 308-A penal code. 
32 art 308-B penal code. 
33 art 309 penal code. 
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B.5. Limits to Fisheries Governance 
Despite the development of new regulatory instruments, restrictions, and sanction systems in 
the last two decades, there is a strong persistence of informal and illegal activities in both 
artisanal/small-scale and industrial productive chains. These activities occur out of sight of 
state regulators or, occasionally, with their compliance and active participation (Palacios, 
2016). In a broader perspective, the limits to fisheries governance are intimately linked to ques-
tions of legitimacy of the state interventions in this area. In many cases, informal or illicit prac-
tices are defined and even co-produced by shifting legal boundaries in terms of access to 
resources, spaces, licenses, or catch quota. In the following, we will deal with four non-exclu-
sive realms: access to fisheries, spatial and extraction restrictions and law enforcement and/or 
legitimacy. 
 
B.5.1. Access to fishing 
Many artisanal and small-scale crews extract resources without having fishing permits, vessel 
permits, or any accreditation. According to the last structural survey of artisanal fishing 
(IMARPE, 2018), about 31% of artisanal fishers fished without having accreditation, and ac-
cording the I census of artisanal fisheries (PRODUCE, 2012) nearly 60% of artisanal vessels 
do not have a permit. In addition, some vessels don’t have a number of registry or operate with 
a false or duplicated registration number – in most cases corresponding to vessels with smaller 
hold capacity. 
 
B.5.2. Spatial restrictions 
Some artisanal and small-scale vessels extract fish in non-permitted areas such as the exclu-
sion zones of the national reserve of Paracas. It is also common that small-scale vessels ex-
tract anchoveta and sardine with purse seine or trawl nets and mechanical equipment inside 
the 3-miles zone, disregarding both, the GFL and the ROP for DHC anchoveta. In the past the 
industrial fleet used to fish anchoveta inside the first 5 miles despite the prohibition. Since 
having SISESAT became mandatory for large-scale vessels, this practice became less fre-
quent but has not being completely eradicated34.  
 
B.5.3. Extraction restrictions 
Extraction below the minimum size, on closure season, using prohibited methods (i.e. dyna-
mite35) and above the quota - or without having one - is common among the artisanal, small-
scale and large-scale fleet. In the case of anchoveta, artisanal and small-scale vessels divert 
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about 150,000 tons of anchoveta for DHC to supply local fishmeal plants (Grillo et al., 2019). 
Also, artisanal and small-scale extraction for DHC which ends up in local and regional markets, 
tends to have a very high rate of juveniles. A recent study showed that between 2018 and 
2019 about 70 % of the fish sold in San José landing site (Lambayeque) and 65% of the fish 
sold in Villa María wholesale market (Lima) were below their minimum catch size (Velez-Zuazo 
et al., 2020).   
The industrial fleet, on the other hand, tends to underreport their extraction levels36 so 
they can extract larger volumes than their quota allows. The practice of extracting anchoveta 
and sardine juveniles, also known as peladilla, can be found in both fleets37. According to 
official sources, between 2012 and 2016 the volumes of exported fishmeal were bigger than 
the volumes of fishmeal produced formally, in average the difference was 68 tons (Grillo et al., 
2019). This suggests that a proportion of fishmeal exports is being produced with non-regis-
tered catch from the industrial fleet. 
 
B.5.4. Law enforcement/or legitimacy 
Fisheries regulation schemes only work if fishers are committed to upholding them and the 
ways in which this is achieved is a complex issue. It is not unusual to conduct and analysis of 
the laws regulating the fisheries and/or aquaculture sectors and find blatant contradictions be-
tween the laws, and the practices on the ground. Compliance with the laws can be subjected 
to changing interests in a specific environment or trust in the institutions among other factors. 
Regarding the latest, in the case of the Peruvian marine-coastal environment were policies are 
developed based on the “best scientific available knowledge”, users question the legitimacy of 
the state and IMARPE (for instance, IMARPE has an ongoing investigation regarding the trans-
parency on the establishment of anchoveta quotas for IHC in 2019; an issue that was de-
nounced by artisanal fishers in several occasions); this is especially true for artisanal and 
small-scale fishers due to a sense of marginalization in opposition to the large-scale fleet and 
the lack of attention to other forms of local traditional knowledge.  
Moreover, many of the activities (illegally) developed are with the implicit approval of the gov-
ernment and it is important to keep in mind that whenever a formalization process starts, win-
dows of opportunity to negotiate questions of legitimacy are made available. For instance, the 
Peruvian state has since long ago identified an increase in the fishing effort of the artisanal 
fleet that is perceived to threaten the sustainability of the resources. As a result, a cutback in 
the registry of new artisanal vessels or the increase of artisanal vessels ‘hold capacity started 
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in 2006; initially, this was a temporary measure that ordered the prohibition of the construction 
of new artisanal vessels whose hold capacity exceeded 10 m3 (DS N°020-2006 PRODUCE) 
but it has not stop since then (Figure 8). In both last formalization periods (2016 and 2018) 
vessels without permit, registry number, and/or sanitary habilitation were able to participate 
regardless of whether or not meet the restrictions described by the prior DS. In this way, open-




Figure 8. Evolution of the restrictions to access the fishery with new artisanal fishing vessels. 
Source: DS N° 020-2006- PRODUCE; DS N° 018-2008-PRODUCE; DS N° 015-2010-PRODUCE, DL N° 1273; 
DL N° 1392; elaborated by Isabel E. Gonzales 
In 2020, due to the Covid19 situation, the term for the formalization of the artisanal fishery, 
normed by the art.4. of the DL N° 1392 [2018], was extended from October 2020 to the 5th of 
October of 2021 (DL Nº 1484 [2020]) 38,39. This was pushed because the resources users 
(embarked and non-embarked artisanal fishers but also artisanal/small-scale vessel owner 
(armadores/as), artisanal processor and fish farmers) affected by Covid19 eligible to apply for 
social aids (a credit of 2000 PEN that has been mobilized by the state through a fund of 22M 
PEN to FONDEPES) need to demonstrate they are formal.  
                                                          
38 https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-legislativo-que-amplia-el-plazo-de-la-vigencia-del-p-
decreto-legislativo-n-1484-1866210-2/  
39 The formalization consists of five stages: (i) Inscription in the list of vessels for the formalization of artisanal 
fishing; (ii) verification of the existence of vessels only in the case of vessels that do not have a a vessels´number 
of registry; (iii) Granting of the vessels´number of registry; (iv) granting of the technical protocol for fishing permit; 
and, (v) granting of fishing permit. 
DS N° 020-2006 
PRODUCE
Temporary 
suspension of boat 
construction < 10m3
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B.6. Conflicts in Fisheries Governance and Management 
There is an important number of tensions and conflicts in the fishing sector including those that 
confront fishers with each other, fishers and other actors of the productive chain, fishers and 
state actors, and fishers and other industries or activities. Differences revolve around topics 
such as competition for resources, degradation of environmental conditions, access re-
strictions, and value appropriation. 
 
B.6.1. Conflicts among fishers 
Conflicts tend to emerge for the competition between artisanal and small-scale fishers that 
share fishing zones but extract in unequal conditions regarding their level of mechanization, 
equipment, and hold capacity. One example is the dispute between balseros, or raft traditional 
fishers, and bolicheros, fishers with conditioned vessels for anchoveta capture. Balseros com-
plain that bolicheros use purse seine nets to fish inside the 5 miles, not only degrading the 
conditions of the fishing zones, but pushing down the price of fish in landing places. They claim 
that the GFL should distinguish between “real” artisanal fishers (those that extract manually 
and in low volumes) and semi-industrial vessel (those that extract using mechanized equip-
ment) (Espinosa, 2019), incorporate bolicheros to the industrial fleet and exclude them from 
the first 5 miles (Palacios, 2016). This is also the case of the calamar [Loligo gahi] in the north 
as artisanal fishers that rely predominantly on hook gears state that fishers are also targeting 
this species with purse seines; which is prohibited in the first 5 miles.  
 
B.6.2. Conflicts between fishers and other actors of the value chain 
Artisanal and small-scale fishers hold tense relations with merchants because of the way the 
price of fish is defined. Many merchants finance fishing trips and occasionally lend money to 
the crew members they work with. By virtue of this financial assistance, they tend to have 
leverage to set the price of catches, usually before the fish gets to the landing sites and below 
market price. Fishers have little capacity to negotiate with merchants, not only because of the 
need for financial resources they provide, but also for their need of a reliable demand due to 
the perishability of fishing resources. 
 
B.6.3. Conflicts between fishers and state actors 
Conflicts with state actors emerge when aim at restricting the access and use of fishing re-
sources, issuing new regulations or sanctioning informal activities. When fishers oppose state 
actions, they tend to claim that the state lacks legitimacy, skills or knowledge of the marine 
environment. In these circumstances, fishers disregard regulations and/or try to change norms 
by stablishing direct dialogues with state representatives or organizing public protests. For 
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example, in day-to-day operations bolicheros fishing for DHC anchoveta do not comply with 
regulations that exclude artisanal and small-scale fleet from the fishmeal industry (Grillo el al., 
2019). But vessel owner organizations are permanently looking for political allies that help 
them advance the formalization of their activities establishing a quota of IHC anchoveta for the 
artisanal and small-scale fleet. In the Ica region, conflicts between fishers and the state have 
also emerged regarding regulations to access the collection of macroalgae; a new regulation 
allowed non-artisanal fishers to access the activity (Mecanismos para el ordenamiento de la 
colecta y acopio de Macroalgas Marinas Varadas, en el ámbito de la región de Ica - RD N° 
642-2018- GORE ICA/GRDE-DIREPRO). In opposition, fishers stated that this RD goes 
against the DS N° 009-2009-PRODUCE (Reglamento de Ordenamiento Pesquero de las 
Macroalgas Marinas)40.  
 
B.6.4. Conflicts between fishers and other economic actors 
Usually conflicts with other economic activities or industries emerge when the development of 
such activity represents a threat to the environmental conditions of the ocean and fishing re-
sources. One recent example of this type of conflict is the opposition of artisanal and small-
scale fishers of Piura and Tumbes to oil exploration in the ocean by Tullow Oil enterprise. 
Fishers claim that oil extraction would entail oil spill hazards and would create environmental 
disturbance. Their activities might impact fish availability, affecting the livelihoods of a large 
number of people that work on the fish production chain in both regions41 (see more in sub-
section C.6.2). Some conflicts also exist between fishers and tourist operators. For instance, 
in Paracas where tourism is an important activity, tourist operators heavily relied on the con-
servation of key species populations such as sea lions while fishers stressed that the abun-
dance of this species is negatively affecting fisheries activities as the sea lions damage the 
fishing gears (IMARPE, 2018). Tourist operators also complained about fishers being irrespon-
sible regarding plastic pollution and fishers also complained that tourism is granted access to 
certain ocean spaces from which they are excluded. 
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C - AQUACULTURE GOVERNANCE 
 
C.1. Legal Framework and Instruments 
Aquaculture was regulated by a specific law in Peru for the first time in May 2001 with the 
approval of Law N° 27460 [2001] (Aquaculture Promotion and Development Act - Ley de pro-
moción y desarrollo de la acuicultura), the management scheme of which was approved that 
same year (DS N° 030-2001-PE) (Table 6). This law aimed, as its name states, to promote 
and develop the aquaculture activity. That same year the Ministry of Fisheries also enacted 
new sanitary regulations (DS N° 040- 2001- PE – Regulaciones sanitarias de las actividades 
de pesca y acuicultura) as a result of the closing of the European Union market for the impor-
tation of Peruvian mollusks due to a hepatitis A epidemic in Valencia (Spain) after the con-
sumption of contaminated bivalves [Donax sp]42.  
 
Table 6. Summary timeline of the main (in place and no longer in place) legislations regarding the Peruvian aqua-
culture.  
Year Law Decree Plans and Policies 
2001 DL N° 27460 (Ley de Promoción y 
Desarrollo de la acuicultura. Valid 
until 2015) 
  
2001  DS N° 030-2001-PE (Reglamento de 
la Ley de Promoción y Desarrollo de 
la Acuicultura. Valid until 2015) 
 
 
2001  DS N° 040-2001-PE (Regulaciones 
sanitarias de las actividades de pesca 
y acuicultura. On place) 
 
2010   National Aquaculture 
Plan (valid until 2021) 
2015 DL N° 1195 (Ley General de Acui-
cultura. On place)  
 
  
2016 DS N° 003-2016-PRODUCE (Re-
glamento de la Ley General de 
Acuicultura. On place) 
  
2019  DS N° 012-2019-PE (Reglamento de 
Gestión Ambiental de los Subsectores 
Pesca y Acuicultura. On place) 
 
Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
In 2010, the national aquaculture development plan was adopted but it was not until 2015, 
under the government of Ollanta Humala Tasso, when the first, and so far, only law to 1) reg-
ulate all phases of the activity, 2) create an own regulatory body and 3) establish the basic 
                                                          
42 Many other legislations followed the DS 040-2001-PE with the aim to try to lift the ban of the import to the UE 
markets. This was achieved in January 2004 (Decisión 2004/30/CEE). 
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definitions, was approved (DL N° 1195 [2015] – Ley General de Acuicultura) (Zavala, 2017). 
One year later its management scheme was adopted (DS N °003-2016-PRODUCE; the latest 
modifications as for today (June 2020) is the DS N° 002-2020-PRODUCE). In 2019, the envi-
ronmental management regulation scheme for the fisheries and aquaculture subsectors was 
approved (DS N° 012-2019-PE). The development of the first national aquaculture policy is 
currently being discussed43. 
 
C.2. Aquaculture Access Regimes 
As mentioned before, according to the art.66. of the Peruvian constitution the renewable and 
non-renewable resources are patrimony of the nation and therefore the state is sovereign in 
their use and the one that grants the use of the resources (through concessions) to individuals 
or companies. However, access to aquaculture can be through 1) concessions and 2) author-
izations. In addition, areas inside protected areas are granted through special concessions 
(see subsection C.5). Moreover, in the first law (DL N° 27460 [2001]), the (exclusively) access 
for organized artisanal fishers to the mariculture of the Peruvian bay scallop was granted 
through restocking44 authorizations45. Nowadays, under the DL N° 1195 [2015] the latest ac-
cess regime is not in force, and therefore there is currently no specific access regime for rec-
ognized organized fishers. This is leading to conflicts as we will explain in subsection C.6.3. 
So, concessions are granted to the development of aquaculture activities in public domains 
land or in public domain aquatic areas, special concessions in natural protected areas and the 
authorizations for the development of aquaculture on non-state private domain land (art.30. 
DL N°1195 [2015]) as was shown in Table 2. 
Today, the process to access the aquaculture activity proceeds as shown in Figure 9 
(below).  
First of all, the areas in which the aquaculture can take place need to be determined 
by PRODUCE based on the technical reports of public and private institutions. Once the areas 
                                                          
43 https://larepublica.pe/economia/2019/08/08/politica-nacional-pesquera-se-terminara-a-fin-de-
ano/?fbclid=IwAR34XVby3jALktBv_qhRq9HZQnLVAWPa6FGipE4ZsHyQlwus6RL-_3LQu9w# 
44 Sowing or re-sowing of hydrobiological species in marine or continental environments, with or without of it, with 
seeds from the natural environments or from production centers – art.8. DS N° 030-2001-PE. 
45 Las acciones de poblamiento o repoblamiento con fines de aprovechamiento responsable de los recursos a 
cargo de comunidades indígenas o campesinas, así como de organizaciones sociales de pescadores artesanales 
debidamente reconocidas por el Ministerio de Pesquería, podrán realizarse mediante convenio de conservación, 
inversión y producción acuícola suscrito con el ministerio de pesquería, que debe contemplar entre otros aspectos, 
los fines y objetivos a alcanzar, zona a poblarse o repoblarse, volúmenes de siembra, acciones de seguimiento y 
periodo previsto de cosecha - DS N° 030-2001-PE. Despite this access regime figure being called “restocking 
authorization” in practice it was not an authorization but a concession as the activity is carried out entirely in a public 
domain. In the current law the figure of restocking goes back to the conservation aim and can only be carried out 
by PRODUCE and the regional governments through restocking plans (with native and naturalized species after 
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are determined they have to be habilitated by DICAPI and need to have the sanitary qualifica-
tion granted by SANIPES. These habilitated areas are then published in the national aquacul-
ture cadastre so that interested applicants can initiate the paper work in order to have access. 
 
 
Figure 9. Process to access the marine aquaculture activity through concessions.  
Sources: DS N°003-2016-PRODUCE; RM N°157-2019-PRODUCE; Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
Applicants need to:  
(i) declare their productive category. The productive category ultimately determines the 
type of organization or company the culture conducting entity needs to be (i.e. AREL, 
AMYPE and AMYGE – see Table 7). 
(ii) comply with the requirements stablished in the TUPA (texto único de procedimientos 
administrativos). 
(iii) present a bail letter46 with a value higher than 6% UIT for AMYPE and 12% for AMYGE 
(none for AREL). This was modified through the RM N°157-2019-PRODUCE as the 
initial management scheme of the DL N° 1195 [2015] (i.e. the DS N° 003-2016-
PRODUCE) stated that the bail letter always had to have a value of 12% of one UIT 
per hectare requested. However, stakeholders complained about the high price, as 
AMYPE, the productive category under which a higher number of rights are granted, is 
mainly formed by associative forms, business or cooperatives, of artisanal fishers that 
have a limited socioeconomic status47.  
                                                          
46 Span. Carta fianza 
47 In addition, the initial management scheme also stated that the bail letter could be executed if the access granting 
process was not initiated within the term of the aquatic reservation (e.g. max 120 days for AMYGE and AMYPE and 
60 days for AREL) but due to the fact that the approval of the environmental management instruments is done by 
other institutions outside PRODUCE or the Regional Governments which slower the process, this was modified so 
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(iv) subscribe with PRODUCE or DIREPRO a Convenio de conservación, inversión y 
producción acuícola. PRODUCE approved through the RM N° 258-2016 this document 
format. This document contains among other things: aims, commitments and obliga-
tions of the parties, declaration of the location, number of hectares, target species and 
geographical coordinates, grounds for expiration of the rights (i.e. transfer the right 
without the approval of the Ministry and the modification of the Convenio or the sub-
scription of a new one; harm the ecosystem; breach the operation schedule and pro-
duction goals as the document describes a progressive occupation of the area and 
must consider a minimum advance of 20% of the occupation of the production area in 
the 1st year, 50% in the 3rd year and 100% until the 8th year; stop reporting monthly for 
two consecutive months or three interleaved; have been sanctioned 3 times consecu-
tively in a three-year periods for the same offense).  
(v) initiate the procedure for the approval of environmental management instrument by the 
ANA. All this need to presented to the Ventanilla Unica de Acuicultura (VUA). 
 
The holders of the areas have the right to use the sea bottom, water column and its surface, 
vertically projected from the sea bottom. This legally excludes any other activity in the cultured 
area, which is another major concern of fishers with respect to the new law (see subsection 
C.6.4.). Having the right of the water column could lead to the exclusion of artisanal fishers in 
aquaculture areas (in which they currently fish) (art.40. DS N° 003-2016-PRODUCE). The con-
cessions have a duration of up to 30 years, renewable for the same period. 
One of the first criticisms that the new law (DL N° 1195 [2015]) received was in relation 
to the production limits. Farmers of Peruvian bay scallop critized the categorical limitation in 
production that come with the abovementioned classification of aquaculture producers for not 
matching culture reality. This is because the production limits (of < 3.5tons, 3.5-150 tons, and 
>150 tons for AREL, AMYPE, and AMYGE, respectively) are estimated based on what is 
landed (i.e. including the shell of the Peruvian bay scallop), while producers typically can only 
market 20% of this volume (which reflect the weight of the scallop´s marketable parts, i.e. 
mussel and/or gonads, remaining after the shell is removed in the processing plants). In fact, 
this regulation was repealed by RM N° 157-2019-PRODUCE but it was reestablished again in 
the following modifications.  
 
                                                          
that the beginning of the process for the approval of the environmental management instrument leads to the auto-
matic extension of the validity of the aquatic area reserve until notification of the resolution that resolves the certifi-
cation procedure of the corresponding environmental management instrument. If the environmental management 
instrument is approved the reservation of the aquatic area is automatically expanded for 15 days (started counting 
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Table 7. Differences between the three productive categories specified in DL N° 1195 [2015] law. 
 AREL AMYPE AMYGE 
Name Acuicultura de Re-
cursos Limitados 
 
Acuicultura de Micro y Pequeña Em-
presa 
Acuicultura de Medi-








Max 3.5 gross tons 
 
 
More than 3.5 gross tons less than 150 
gross tons  
More than 150 gross 
tons 
Legal Status Natural persons. In-
cluded the activities 
conducted by edu-




Natural and legal persons Natural and legal per-
sons 
Observations  Also inside this category the research 
authorizations, the seed production 
centers and the production of orna-






Non. Follow the leg-















DIREPRO Central government 
(PRODUCE) 
Sanitary Habili-





Yes (granted by SANIPES) 
Source: DS N° 003-2016-PRODUCE; Elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
As mentioned, the access through restocking authorizations no longer exists. When the DL N° 
1195 [2015] came into force, it was first decided that all the restocking authorizations were 
going to be automatically categorized as AMYPE (DS N° 003-2016-PRODUCE). This hap-
pened through the DS N° 014-2017-PRODUCE. However, more recently through the DS N° 
008-2020-PRODUCE it was stated that for the current active 186 restocking authorizations 
(granted at the time by the regional governments of Piura, Áncash, Tacna, Arequipa and 
Moquegua) the general directorate of aquaculture of the Vice Ministry of Fisheries and Aqua-
culture of PRODUCE will be publishing the historical production of the last five years corre-
sponding to the holders of those restocking authorizations; and that according to these values, 
the holders need to present their request to adapt to an AMYPE (needs to be presented to the 
regional governments) or an AMYGE (needs to be presented to PRODUCE) until the 31st of 
May 2020.  
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C.3. Extraction Restrictions 
C.3.1. Minimum sizes  
As of June 2020, and according to the national aquaculture cadastre, the target species of 
mariculture  in Peru are: concha de abanico [Argopecten purpuratus], cochayuyo [Eisenia 
cokeri],  sargazo [macrocystis pyrifera], huiro [Lessonia trabeculata] and other unspecified al-
gae species, langostino  [Litoenaeus vannamei] (although in the past also other species were 
targeted48), lenguado japonés or hirame [Paralichthys olivaceus], chita [Anisotremus scapu-
laris], lisa marina [Mugil cephalus], macha  [Mesodesma donacium], chanque [Concholepas 
concholepas], erizo [Loxechinus albus], lapa [Fissurella limbate], caracol [Thais chocolata], 
corvina [Cilus gilberti], pulpo  [Octopus mimus], and choro  [Aulacomya atra]. According to the 
RM N° 209-2001-PE (Annex II) some of these cultivated species are also under minimum size 
regulations for its commercialization (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Minimum size for the commercialization of cultivated species. 
Species Length/weight  Measurement 
Caracol [Thais chocolata] 6.0 cm Peristomal length 
Concha de abanico [Argopecten purpuratus] 6.5 cm Valve height 
Chanque [Concholepas concholepas]  8.0 cm Peristomal length 
Choro [Aulacomya atra] 6.5 cm Valve height 
Lapa [Fissurella limbate] 6.0 cm Valve height 
Macha [Mesodesma donacium] 7.0 cm Valve height 
Erizo [Loxechinus albus] 7.0 cm Shell diameter 
Pulpo [Octopus mimus] 1.0 kg - 
Chita [Anisotremus scapularis] 24 cm   
Lisa [Mugil cephalus] 32 cm  
Corvina [Cilus gilberti] 55 cm  
Source: Produce49; elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
C.3.2. Exclusion zones 
Unlike fisheries that, unless otherwise specified, can be carried out in all the ocean space, 
mariculture can only be conducted in habilitated ocean spaces (see Figure 9). As of June 2020, 
and according to the national aquaculture cadastre the total area of the Peruvian sea dedicated 
to mariculture is of 24333 ha. From those, 315 ha are inside marine-costal protected areas, 
specifically inside the Paracas national reserve with the aim of producing Peruvian bay scal-
lops. In the other marine-coastal protected areas (i.e. San Fernando and Islas, Islotes and 
Puntas Guanreas national reserves; Illescas and Ancón reserve areas; the national sanc-
turaries of Lagunas de Mejía and Manglares de Tumbes and the Albufera medio mundo) no 
aquaculture is conducted. Mariculture can only be conducted inside protected areas following 
evaluation of compatibility with the management plans of the protected areas, the presentation 
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of a favorable environmental impact assessment and according to the marine zoning and fa-
vorable technical opinion approved by SERNANP. Moreover, preferably the mariculture activ-
ities have to be developed in floating or suspended systems that include the phases of plank-
tonic larvae catch, pre-breeding, fattening and harvesting when appropriate (that is the case 
of the Peruvian bay scallop) (art.43. - RM N° 003-2016-PRODUCE). 
Another exclusion area are the “corridors” that separate the aquatic concessions; this 
separation needs to be bigger than 100 meters. This regulation was included with the DL N° 
1195 [2015] in order to respect the free transit and navigation of fishing boats, the currents and 
prevent the eutrophication of the marine environment. As a result, the aforementioned corri-
dors are generally a forbidden area to develop mariculture unless the holders of the conces-
sions reach an agreement with the fishers from the area; this creates conflicts as we will ex-
plain in subsection C.8 (art.40. - RM N° 003-2016-PRODUCE). 
 
C.3.3 Temporary restrictions: temporal closures 
Here it is important to mention the closures of specific areas that are imposed to the extraction 
of the Peruvian bay scallop from natural banks. That is the case for the natural banks of the 
Pisco coastline and the Callao region since 2003 (RM N° 189-2003-PRODUCE), and at the 
Lobos de Tierra island in Piura since 2006 (RM N° 293-2006-PRODUCE). This is important as 
the mariculture of the Peruvian bay scallop largely depends (especially in the Sechura Bay) on 
the obtention of scallop seeds from natural banks.  
Regarding also the Peruvian bay scallop, the whole value chain can be affected by 
temporal harvest closures if the sanitary requirements established by SANIPES, through its 
bivalve mollusk control program (PCMB), are not accomplished. About the monitoring in the 
aquatic areas, SANIPES counts with several monitoring locations in every productive marine 
area of Peru, from which samples are taken and analyzed. Monitoring occurs every week, 
every two weeks or twice a year depending on the measured variables; marine biotoxins, po-
tentially toxic phytoplankton and oceanographic variables (such as temperature, salinity, pH, 
dissolved oxygen and turbidity); hepatitis A virus and microbiological indicators; and heavy 
metals respectively. This is the case for the Peruvian bay scallops produced to be exported to 
the European Union; in the case of production to non-European Union Market marine biotox-
ins, potentially toxic phytoplankton and oceanographic variables are monitored biweekly. 
When this happens, an inspection for the release of the aquatic lots that have their mariculture 
products immobilized needs to be carried out.  
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C.4. Surveillance and Sanctioning Systems 
As mentioned in subsection B.4. the system of control and of infractions and sanctions is de-
fined by the RISPAC (DS N° 017-2017-PRODUCE). Moreover, in the DS N° 003-2016-
PRODUCE it is also stated that any activity that violates the regulative scheme of infractions 
and sanitary sanctions for fisheries and aquaculture (RISSPA) would be considered liable to 
sanction. However, this has not yet been approved (as of June 2020). 
Broadly speaking, the infractions related to the aquaculture activity are: carrying out 
aquaculture activities without having access (either because it has not been granted, either 
because it has been suspended) or without being the holder of the right; using the area for a 
different aquaculture purposes and/or fail to comply with the management plan and/or unjusti-
fiably breach the investment or production goals, that supported the granting of the access; 
failing to comply with the obligations set forth as causal of expiration in the Convenio de con-
servación, inversion y producción acuícola; not reporting to the competent authorities the ap-
pearance of any infectious break; importing, exporting or re-exporting species without permit 
to do so; failing to progressively occupy the defined area for the production and investment 
and/or not complying with the delimitation of the aquatic area; obtaining seeds from the natural 
environment without the necessary permit; installing or implementing unauthorized infrastruc-
tures, materials or equipment; interfering with traditional activities or affect the rights acquired 
by others outside the granted aquatic area; developing research, technological and innovation 
activities without having informed to the competent authorities.  
The type of sanctions it is not the same for the mentioned infractions. For instance, the 
illegal extraction and processing of aquatic species is a typified crime in the penal code 
(art.308-B) that can be punished with up to five years in prison.  In the case of the Peruvian 
bay scallop this is the case for the extraction of seeds from the natural banks of Lobos de 
Tierra island, Pisco and Callao, and for the processing of Peruvian bay scallops in unauthor-
ized establishments. 
 
C.5. Limits to Aquaculture Governance 
Following the same structure as subsection B.5. informal and illegal activities in aquaculture 
can be found in: the access to the activity and spatial and extraction restrictions. Here we will 
focus on the case of the Peruvian bay scallop, especially in the case of Sechura Bay, where 
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C.5.1. Access to culture areas 
As we have mentioned, the DL N° 1195 [2015] eliminated the access regime of restocking 
authorization (access by which the marine environment of Sechura Bay had only been habili-
tated) which granted exclusivity access rights to OSPAs and indigenous and peasant commu-
nities. However, in Sechura Bay prior to 2015 third parties (including big companies) already 
had access to Peruvian bay scallop farming production via informal and illegal ways (key in-
formant – December 2019). This happened via two ways: (i) renting, in which the OSPA would 
rent the area to another person/company for exchange of money and then the person/company 
is able to conduct cultures as they please on this area, while the members of the organizations 
are typically not involved in the grow out activities. This was illegal if not done following the 
regulations of the DL N° 27460 [2001], according to which the authorizations could only be 
transferred to third parties with the authorization of the Ministry of Fisheries (today PRODUCE) 
and by developing a new Convenio de conservación, inversión y producción acuícola or an 
addendum to it (art.29. DS N° 030-2001-PE50); and, if it happened under DL N° 1195 [2015], 
the transferred needed to be done also with the authorization of the Ministry and by changing 
the owner and developing a new Convenio de conservación, inversión y producción acuícola 
always as long as it is proved to have complied with 20% of the productive plan (art.47. DS N° 
003-2016-PRODUCE51). Moreover, as explained in subsection C.4. the aquatic activities need 
to be carried out by the owners of the right. A second option for gaining access was (ii) selling, 
in which the holders of the areas changes. This would be illegal under the DL N° 27460 [2001] 
law if the new owners of the restocking authorization are not artisanal fishers of an OSPA.  
A third – formal – option are (iii) agreements, in which the fishers’ organizations would 
not lose the ownership of the access regime, but a business person that is interested in invest-
ing money on the sector elaborates a production agreement for a specified temporal duration 
                                                          
50 Las concesiones y autorizaciones para el desarrollo de la acuicultura pueden ser transferidas a terceros mediante 
cesión de posición contractual para cuyo efecto debe suscribirse previamente un nuevo Convenio de 
Conservación, Inversión y Producción Acuícola o el Addendum, de ser el caso y contar con la autorización del 
Ministerio de Pesquería. Esta autorización no exime al nuevo titular del cumplimiento de las obligaciones 
consideradas en la resolución autoritativa correspondiente. Con posterioridad al cumplimiento de los dispuesto en 
el numeral anterior, los derechos de concesión en uso de área acuática otorgados por DICAPI, son tranferidos a 
terceros mediante la emisión de la RD correspondiente.  
51 La transferencia del derecho administrativo de concesiones y autorizaciones para el desarrollo de la acuicultura 
se tramitan a través del procedimiento de cambio de titular ante el PRODUCE y el Gobierno Regional, según 
corresponda. En el caso de transferencia de concesiones previamente se debe suscribir el Convenio e 
Conservación, Inversión y Producción Acuícola con el PRODUCE o el Gobierno Regional, según corresponda. Las 
concesiones y autorizaciones se transfieren bajo las mismas condiciones, términos, y plazos en que fueron 
otorgadas, sin que se exima al nuevo titular del cumplimiento de las obligaciones consideradas en la resolución 
autoritativa correspondiente. En el caso, de sucesión hereditaria los sucesores deben tramitar en un plazo máximo 
de seis meses de ocurrido el deceso, el cambio de titular del derecho. El cambio de titular del derecho de uso de 
área acuática, así como la licencia de uso de agua, se tramita de manera conjunta con el cambio de titular del 
derecho administrativo de concesión y autorización correspondiente. El cambio de titular de concesiones, excepto 
el caso de sucesión hereditaria, se puede realizar siempre que se haya acreditado haber cumplido con el 20% de 
ejecución del proyecto de acuerdo a lo establecido en el Convenio de Conservación, Inversión y Producción 
Acuícola suscrito entre el titular del derecho y el PRODUCE o el Gobierno Regional, según corresponda. 
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(usually for one or two grow out cycles (of 9-12 month each)) with the fishers and then the 
profits are divided. In this case, usually the productive activities are conducted by the members 
of the associations. In this case none illegality occurs, regardless under which law this oc-
curred, as it is basically that the OPSA activities are funded by and external investor.  
The mentioned strategies have been a common resource for OSPAs when due to high 
mortality events (derived from red tides or ENSO phenomena) they have lost a lot of money 
and do not have the capital to keep investing in the activity. Or also when due to their depend-
ency on big companies to access export markets they are force to sell their products with no 
profit margin. This issue has originated that, according to key informants, around 60-70% of 
the bay is in the hands of big companies (although there are no studies available yet). 
 
C.5.2. Spatial restrictions 
Two main illegal activities occur in three different spaces of Sechura Bay: (1) the development 
of Peruvian bay scallop farming activities in areas that are not respectively authorized (i.e. in 
the buffer zone of the Bay and in the corridors that separate the aquatic concessions); (2) the 
extraction of seeds from the Lobos de Tierra island. Regarding the latter, it is important to keep 
in mind that obtaining seeds is a bottleneck for the production of the Peruvian bay scallop; and 
although formally, according to the law, seeds can be obtained from the natural environment 
(Figure 10) since 2006 (as we have seen in subsection C.4.5.), it is illegal to do so from Lobos 
de Tierra island; which is the main source of seeds together with the natural banks of the 
Sechura Bay.  
 
 
Figure 10. Way of obtaining seeds for the production of the Peruvian bay scallop. *the seed production centers 
need to be authorized by the regional government and habilitated in sanitary terms by SANIPES.  
Source: DS N° 003-2016- PRODUCE; elaborated by María Garteizgogeascoa 
 
C.5.3. Extraction restrictions  
The main illegality regarding the harvest of Peruvian bay scallops in Sechura is the fact that it 
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they come from another (Kluger et al., 2019). Despite the fact that it is mandatory to land and 
commercialize the aquaculture production according to its origin (traceability of products), in 
Sechura, the aquatic areas are far away from the coast and the enforcement of rules is weak 
due to budget limitations that do not allow for tight marine surveillance. As a result, scallops 
that have not been certified for its extraction can be added to certified ones; this exchange 
happens in the middle of the ocean where it remains largely invisible. Another issue is the 
presence of pamperos; people that (illegally) extract Peruvian bay scallop (and whatever other 
species available) from the bay without valid access. 
 
C.5.4. Law enforcement/legitimacy 
As has been mentioned for fisheries, in the mariculture of the Peruvian bay scallop there are 
also limitations regarding the enforcement of rules and legitimacy of the state institutions. For 
instance, Peruvian bay scallop farming has developed illegally with somehow the implicit ap-
proval of the government as it would be impossible to produce so much scallops without the 
(illegal) extraction of seeds (a bottle neck for the activity) from the Lobos de Tierra island. As 
mentioned, the extraction in the island is banned but the fact that the ban from 2006 is still on 
place is being questioned by users as recent scientific studies have suggested exploitable 
levels in the island. Moreover, Sechura Bay was considered a “worthless” MSES until the Pe-
ruvian bay scallop industry took off. Then the state progressively designed institutional rules 
regarding the access that moved from formally (and exclusively) granting permit to artisanal 
fishers to paving the way for large-scale investors to hold the majority of property rights and to 
take control of the entire production process; this has decreased the legitimacy on the state 
institutions. 
In the process of regulation of the Bay, that started in 2000 and continues to this day, 
as for fisheries, windows of opportunity to negotiate questions of legitimacy were made avail-
able. Indeed, many of the rules established in the Bay aimed at formalizing (informal) aquacul-
ture concessions; for example, the illegal presence of OSPAs in the Núcleo II Matacaballo (a 
zoned area of the Bay) and the illegal use of one mile of the Buffer Zone (anther zoned area 
of the Bay) for mariculture activities was resolved by habilitating and granting aquaculture re-
stocking authorizations in both places. This implied the derogation of a previously issued RD 
(RD N° 360-2010-GRP-DIREPRO-DR) that did not allow the verification of new OSPAs aiming 
to order the start of the process to be granted an authorization for the restocking of the Peru-
vian bay scallop in the Sechura Bay.  
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C.6. Conflicts in Aquaculture Governance and Management 
Here we will present some of the conflictive situations in which the Peruvian bay scallop farm-
ing activity is embedded in two departments: Atenas (i.e. on the other side of Paracas Bay, 
between Paracas and San Andrés), Paracas and Independence Bay (Ica) and Sechura Bay 
(Piura). 
 
C.6.1. Conflicts related to coastal space 
Peruvian bay scallop farmers in Atenas have reported to feel threatened by urban development 
projects expanding across the Paracas peninsula and successively surrounding the settle-
ments of aquaculture concession owners. Reports of violent visits and corruption leading in 
favor of further expansion and land trafficking have been received leading to scallop farmer 
feeling left alone by the state (key informant – November 2019). Also in the Ica region, the 
TGPSM (Terminal Portuario General San Martín), a multipurpose project has given rise to a 
strong conflict. The TGPSM was concessioned in favor of the Consorcio Terminal Portuario 
Paracas S.A. (TPP) in 2014 for 30 years. Previously it was the port of San Martín which was 
constructed in 1969 inside what after became the Paracas national reserve and served as the 
export window of minerals extracted in the Andes, the Camisea gas and agricultural products. 
In 2016 the environmental impact assessment of the TGPSM was approved. However, in 2019 
a modification of the environmental impact assessment (MEIA) was processed. This included 
the plan to build a new road through the Paracas national reserve, a mineral warehouse, and 
a desalination and a sewage treatment plant. The SENACE published 277 observations to the 
MEIA from which 33 could not be addressed by the project owner52. This led to the rejection 
of the MEIA through the RD N° 00025-2019-SENACE-PE/DEIN. On top of this institutional 
response, the population of Paracas has strongly opposed the project alerting the impact it 
could have on the marine-coastal ecosystems, biodiversity and landscape aesthetics and 
therefore in the tourist and fisheries sector53. However, in July 2019 the SENACE annulated 
the mentioned RD and opened the possibility to a new evaluation of the MEIA. The whole 
process restarted and under the need to implement citizens participation mechanisms, in No-
vember of 2019 an 8h public audience of the MEIA took place in Paracas. The term for all 
people to present comments on the MEIA was opened until the 23rd December 2019 and 
SENACE rejected the MEIA on July, 29th; and finally also the appeal filed by TPP in November 
2020.54 
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C.6.2. Conflicts related to marine extractive industries 
(Illegal) plants for the production of fishmeal and/or fish oil from anchoveta are located in front 
of Atenas. When the anchoveta season starts, Peruvian bay scallop farmers have reported 
that waste water (from washing tanks, throwing waste water into ocean) reaches Atenas and 
kills off the scallop cultures. 
Also, as mentioned in subsection B.6., there are conflicts between fishers from the 
north and oil companies and the state. In Peru the Law N° 26221 [1993] – Ley orgánica de 
Hidrocarburos established in 1993 with its Unique Ordered Text approved through the DS N° 
042-2005-EM aims to promote the investment in hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation ac-
tivities through PeruPetro S. A. In recent years a modification to this law has been proposed 
(bill 98/2016-CR, 1525/2016-CR, 2145-2017-PE) being the most controversial point a change 
in the payments that the companies have to do depending on the production values55. Moreo-
ver, in 2017/2018 under the presidency of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (hours before his resigna-
tion) permits for the exploration/exploitation of hydrocarbons in front of the coast of Sechura 
and Paita – Piura department (more specifically in lot Z-65) were granted.  Permits were also 
granted for the lots Z-64 (in front of the coast of Tumbes and Contralmirante Villar - Tumbes 
department), Z-66 (in front of the coast of Chiclayo and Lambayeque – Lambayeque depart-
ment), Z-67 (in front of the coast of Santa, Casma and Huarney – Áncash department), and Z-
68 (in front of the coast of Casma and Huarney - Ancash department). However, two months 
later, in October 2018 under the presidency of Martín Vizcarra, they were derogated through 
the DS N° 011-2018-EM because of noncompliance guaranteeing the rights of access to in-
formation and citizen participation in the decision-making processes.  
In 2019, this changed and Z-64 was granted (to an Irish company: Tullow Peru Limited Sucur-
sal del Peru56; and in July 2020 (DS N° 016-2020-EM & DS N° 017-2020-EM) the same oc-
curred for the exploitation of the Z-67 and Z-68. This did not happen without the strong criticism 
from fishers that have questioned the participatory process indicating that the people that have 
signed it do not represent the fishers or the population in general. Despite this, the government 
has kept promoting the hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation in the coast of Peru and especially 
in the northern coast (Figure 11, following page). 
Between Piura and Tumbes (the two departments of the north coast) 1200 active oil 
wells exist; those provided 66% of the national production of oil during 2018. But this area is 
also one of the most biodiverse points of the Peruvian sea. For these reasons, fishers and 
maricultors (especially from the provinces of Paita, Sechura and Talara) have carried out a 
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number of general strikes57 as a way of protesting throughout 2019 and 2020. Fishers have 
declared that the exploration activities could harm the fishing activity due to the seismic sur-
veys needed to locate the oil wells; in addition there are concerns about pollution, especially 
for scallop farmers who have stressed the sensitivity of the species as a filter mollusk and the 
importance of meeting the sanitary requirements demanded by the international market.  
 
 
Figure 11. Hydrocarbon lots in coastal Peru; on the left general vision of the situation in coastal Peru and on the 
right zoom of the northern part of the country. In green lots granted through contracts, in purple lots under negotia-
tion, in orange technical evaluation agreement contract. (Source: Perupetro58) 
 
In contrast, the government defends that the hydrocarbon operations have been carried 
out for several decades in the country without any negative effect on fishing and more specif-
ically to artisanal fishing as many of the lots are outside of the 5 miles where artisanal fishers 
predominantly fish. In addition, it has declared that the state is committed to inform the popu-
lation, to guarantee no impact for the fisheries sector, and has emphasized that the develop-
ment of oil activities could bring huge monetary benefits to the coastal communities that still 
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lack of basic services such as water and sewage networks59,60. On the other hand, fishers and 
conservation platforms have alerted several times about oil spills61,62. 
 
C.6.3. Conflicts related to management and governance 
According to our analysis, three main conflicts have emerged in Sechura Bay in recent years. 
First, as mentioned before with the DL N° 1195 [2015] companies gained access to the pro-
duction node of the Peruvian bay scallop value chain. Prior to this law the role of big companies 
was mainly to buy the product to fishers to process it and export it although since 2013 fishers 
have been protesting about the power of those to set up the prices. Now, big companies that 
have stronger capital for investment are able to produce their own product and do not need to 
buy it from fishers’ social organizations. However, fishers still need the big companies in order 
to be able to export their product as they don´t have access to the export facilities (such as 
processing plants, market networks, etc). In addition, with the new law and the creation of the 
productive categories, aquatic areas falling in the category of AMYGE (the majority of the old 
restocking authorizations. RD N° 00006-2020-PRODUCE/DGA) are in the hands of the central 
government instead of in the region and subjected to a bigger taxation system and bigger 
environmental requirements. Second, during the last political term of DIREPRO-Piura (a new 
one entered the administration in January 2019) the revocation of some aquaculture conces-
sions occurred. However, affected fishers state that the sanction that led to the revocation was 
not reasoned well enough. According to the affected fishers, the area was revoked for failing 
to file on time the semi-annual report of activities carried out. Fishers have argued that those 
areas, illegally revoked, were granted to companies or relatives of former political leaders63 
despite they brought the case to the courts. Third, the closure of the Lobos de Tierra island 
which territorially belongs to the department of Lambayeque but is directly connected to the 
department of Piura due to its importance as a source of seed for the aquaculture activity in 
the Sechura Bay. The constitutional court has dictated that the management needs to be co-
ordinated between both departments although the political tension between both regions com-
plicates the matter. Moreover, in 2018 IMARPE conducted an evaluation of the natural banks 
resulting in the availability of 13000tons of Peruvian bay scallop; a quantity enough to lift the 
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closure, however this has not been done despite the fact that all aquaculture norms need to 
be supported by the best scientific data available. 
 
C.6.4. Conflicts among Peruvian bay scallop farmers and with fishers 
Three main conflicts occurred between Peruvian bay scallop farmers and with fishers. First, 
some OPSAs or certain members of the OSPAs have sold their aquatic concessions to big 
companies or third parties in many cases without the consent of all members. Basically, some 
OSPA members, have expelled their members by arguing that they do not show up to the 
meetings (to which they have not been invited), not calling them to extract the product, etc. 
Second, that in contrast to the previous aquaculture law (DL N° 27460 [2001]) in which the 
holder of the concessions had the right over the authorized hydrobiological resources but not 
to the water column, with the DL N° 1195 [2015], holders of the areas do have the right to use 
the sea bottom, water column and its surface, vertically projected from the sea bottom, which 
has originated a major concern of fishers. Having the right of the water column could lead to 
the exclusion of artisanal fishers in aquaculture areas in which they currently fish (art.40. DS 
N° 003-2016-PRODUCE). The third type of conflict is sparked by the common practice of steal-
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ANNEX I            
 
Table AI. Overview of characteristics commercial and non-commercial fisheries as described by the 









Research   
Sports Subsistence 












Who does it? Natural or legal 
person. 
- - - - 








Doesn’t detail Doesn’t detail Doesn’t detail Does not detail 
Size Artisanal: until 
32.6 m3 of hold 
capacity and un-
til 15 m of over-
all length. 
Small Scale: un-





- - - 
Fishing permit or 
authorization  













¿ ¿ ¿ 
Fishing permit 
transference 




No Yes (for Direct 
human con-
sumption) 
- - - 
Elaborated by Isabel E.Gonzales 
